Louise Arbour on
Self-Determination
During the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, ICG
President Louise Arbour speaks of the complexity facing
international jurists in cases of territorial integrity and desires
for self-determination, and discusses the variety of cases involved,
from Kosova to Somaliland – all of whom
are linked by a history lacking in access to inclusive governance.
Below is Louise Arbour’s speech published by the International
Crisis Group including access to video and audio recordings:
Since 1998 the International Crisis Group has supported independence
for Kosovo. Back then – even before the NATO war – Crisis Group
argued that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been “unwilling
to permit the free exercise of the Kosovo Albanians’ right of
self-determination” and that Kosovo was “now entitled to create its
own international status, separate from that of the FRY”. The denial
by the Belgrade government of the Kosovo Albanians’ political,
economic, cultural and social rights meant that they had a right to
seek self-determination externally.
Since then we’ve published 46 reports on Kosovo. Our most recent,
published last month, August 2010, included a controversial
recommendation that international actors not prevent Kosovo and Serb
negotiators including land swaps in their talks if that would help
draw a close to the conflict. But our position on Kosovo
independence has remained much the same for the last twelve years:
we support Kosovo’s right to secede and to be recognized as an
independent state.
A few months ago, in May 2010, we published a report on war crimes
in Sri Lanka. In it we detail ed the violation of
international humanitarian law by the Sri Lankan security forces and
the Tamil Tigers during the last five months of their 30-year civil
war. The evidence we gathered suggests that these months saw tens of
thousands of Tamil civilian men, women, children and the elderly
killed, countless more wounded, and hundreds of thousands deprived
of adequate food and medi cal care, resulting in more deaths.
The evidence provides reasonable grounds to believe the Sri Lankan
security forces committed war crimes, including the intentional
shelling of civilians, of hos pitals and of humanitarian
operations, with top government and military leaders potentially
res ponsible.
We called for an international investigation into the alleged war
crimes in Sri Lanka, given both the absence of political will or
capacity for genuine domestic investigations. We believe that
accounting for crimes is necessary to address the grievances
underlying conflict in Sri Lanka. And yet, despite the increasing
authoritarianism of the Sri Lanka government and its still appalling
treatment of the Tamil minority, we believe that the best means of
ensuring the Tamils’ right to self determination is within the
existing borders of the Sri Lankan state, with the Sri Lankan
government improving both the conditions in which Tamils live and
mechanisms for their representation in government. We even argue
that the Tamil diaspora – chief source of financial and ideological
support for the defeated Tigers – must not only renounce LTTE
methods but also move away from its separatist ideology if it is to
play a useful role in resolving the conflict.
In Sudan, the south’s self determination referendum is scheduled for
early 2011. If genuine, the vote will almost certainly see
southerners vote for secession from the north. The Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, signed in 2005 between north and south, which
provides for the referendum, envisaged the Khartoum government
implementing reforms that would make unity attractive to the south,
including increasing opportunities for representation and wealth
sharing and addressing the long standing discrimination against the
periphery by Khartoum – the principle cause of conflict in Sudan.
Very little progress has been made, however, on those reforms,
mostly due to the intransigence of President Bashir’s ruling
National Congress Party. Crisis Group supported the implementation
of the CPA, including its objective of making unity attractive. That
goal appears to have failed, and we therefore argue that Sudanese,
regional and international parties must prepare for south’s
secession, including by resolving questions of borders, oil revenue
and international recognition. With a vote for independence likely,
it is vital that the secession take place as peacefully as possible.
The conflicts in Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Sudan are only three of
approximately sixty conflict situations on which Crisis Group
reports. (We publish, incidentally, about 85 reports each year, all
of which are sent around to policy makers and other subscribers and
publicly available on our website. Most contain recommendations, and
we promote our views through intensive advocacy, not only in Western
capitals and the United Nations, but also increasingly in emerging
centres of power in the global south. We believe that while
mobilising public support is useful on some issues, on complex
matters it is more important to engage directly the relevant
policy-makers.)
As these three cases - Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Sudan - illustrate, a
recurrent source of potential – and actual – deadly confrontation,
and a frequent theme in our reporting, lies in a clash between the
principle of territorial integrity and the right to self
determination, a clash that take place at the confluence of law,
politics, power, economics and identity. Crisis Group has dealt with
a variety of situations in the last several years where conflict,
including armed conflict, was triggered either by the purported
exercise of the right to self determination, or by efforts to resist
it. In many cases secession claims are rooted in a history of
repression, exclusionary visions of governance, or the denial of
rights to minority groups. I mentioned Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Sudan,
but I could just as easily have included Montenegro – where we have
supported independence; Northern Iraq – we have defended the unity
and territorial integrity of Iraq; or Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, Aceh or
Kashmir – where we have avoided taking explicit positions either for
or against secession.
Every conflict situation is of course different – as this list shows
– so analysis must be first and foremost contextual. That said, it
is useful to explore the contours of the right to self determination
in order to offer prescriptions for conflict prevention that are as
well anchored in law as they are in political reality.
The thrust of my argument starts from the basis that neither the
right to self-determination nor the principle of territorial
integrity can a priori trump each other. Only by understanding when
– and how – the right to self-determination applies can we
effectively put in place processes which stand some chance of
averting – or rapidly ending – secessionist-based conflicts.
So let’s start with the legal framework. And in that regard, the
recent opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality
of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence provides a
useful, but not a dispositive, backdrop. On 22 July 2010, The ICJ
rendered its non-binding opinion on the question posed to it by the
General Assembly, which was: ‘Is the unilateral declaration of
independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo in accordance with international law?’
I don’t propose to engage here in a detailed analysis of the
opinion. Suffice to say that the court was careful to articulate the
narrow scope of its opinion. It concluded that, in the
circumstances, the Kosovo unilateral declaration was not in
violation of international law. The court, however, went no further.
It explicitly refrained from ruling on the legality of secession
itself. As such it did not address the efficacy of Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence, or of the level of
international recognition that it attracted, in creating an
independent, sovereign Kosovo state.
The ICJ’s opinion in the Kosovo case may or may not lead to a wave
of additional recognition for Kosovo’s independence – these will be
political reactions to the court’s opinion. As the court points out,
some unilateral declarations of independence have in the past been
specifically repudiated by the international community – those of
Southern Rhodesia in 1965, Northern Cyprus in 1983 and of the
Republika Srpska in Bosnia in 1992. But in all these instances, the
Security Council made a determination based on the concrete
situation existing at the time those declarations were made. The
illegality of those declarations of independence stemmed not from
their unilateral character but from the fact that they were, or
would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other
egregious violations of norms of international law. The exceptional
character of the resolutions regarding Southern Rhodesia, Northern
Cyprus and of the Republika Srpska confirmed, in the view of the ICJ,
that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of
independence could be inferred from previous Security Council
decisions.
So while secessionists elsewhere would be wise to take limited
comfort from the court’s opinion in the Kosovo case; equally would
those authorities who currently assert the sanctity of their
existing borders as an absolute bar to any secessionist demands. The
ICJ’s Kosovo judgement leaves unanswered the important legal
question of whether a right to secession can be found in the right
to self-determination and if so, in what circumstances.
For that we need to examine the right to self determination – which
is a fundamental human right, expressed as such in Art. 1 of the
United Nations Charter, and in Art.1 of each of the two main
international human rights instruments: the International Covenant
on Civil and Political rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both covenants state that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.
Even though it is formulated not as an individual right but as “the
right of a people”, it belongs to the body of international law that
concerns itself directly with the rights of individuals, or peoples,
rather than states, and is considered a general principle of
international law.
The third paragraph in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights has particular significance in the context of the right
to self determination and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It
reads as follows:
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights be protected by the rule of law,
Since self-determination is a fundamental human right, it should be
protected by the rule of law if man is not to turn, as the preamble
says “….as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression.” It is unclear whether turning to “rebellion” is meant
to be a mere description of reality, or whether it contains an
acceptance that in the face of tyranny and oppression, rebellion
would be not only inevitable, but justifiable.
On its face, the right of peoples to freely determine their
political status does not address how and when this right is to be
exercised. Whether the exercise of the right to self determination
includes an entitlement to full state sovereignty therefore requires
an examination of the principle of the territorial integrity of
states. That principle is most often advanced to block any
secessionist claim. The ICJ in its consideration of the Kosovo case
made an important observation – namely that the scope of the
principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of
relations between States. By contrast, however, the right to
self-determination deals with relations between states and
“peoples”. It is an important distinction – and when competing
principles clash, they should be interpreted in a way that maximizes
the fullest effect of both. We must therefore seek to reconcile
these apparently competing principles.
International law has developed a framework to render these
otherwise competing principles compatible by asserting that
self-determination is a right that must initially be fulfilled
internally. This imposes on sovereign states serious obligations
regarding both democracy – participation, as the method for a people
to freely determine its political status – and protection of
minority rights, to ensure the free pursuit of a people’s economic,
social and cultural development.
In that way international law will protect the territorial integrity
of a state whose government represents all the people or peoples on
its territory, without discrimination and in full respect of their
rights to pursue the fulfilment of their social, economic and
cultural rights, including language rights, freedom of religion,
freedom of speech and of assembly and so forth.
But when a state is unable or unwilling to provide for the internal
fulfilment of the right to self-determination, that right may become
an external right, and at that point override the principle of
territorial integrity by providing to “a people” a right to secede
from a parent state. This has been recognized in the case of peoples
under colonial rule or foreign occupation (although in that case it
is in a sense their own territorial integrity which must be
restored). But the same could be said of cases of subjugation,
domination or exploitation of a people by its parent state, where
the denial of the internal right to self-determination is so
profound that the external right should be triggered.
In the Kosovo case, the ICJ referred to claims that the population
of Kosovo has the right to create an independent state because of
the province’s recent history but explicitly refused to deal with
that issue on the basis that it was beyond the scope of the question
posed to it by the General Assembly. The Supreme Court of Canada did
consider the scope of the right to self -determination, in its
landmark opinion in the Quebec secession Reference in 1996, and,
without deciding the point, noted that a right to secession could
possibly arises “where “a people” is denied any meaningful exercise
of its right to self-determination within the state of which it
forms a part.”
At this stage it is fair to say that there is in international law
no right as such to secede unilaterally from a parent state, but the
right to self-determination may permit, in certain circumstances,
unilateral secession and in such a case international recognition
completes the process and gives efficacy to the creation of the
newly created state.
Of course the legal framework informs, but only partially, the
political response to claims of that nature. From a conflict
prevention perspective, there can be no absolutist position.
Territorial integrity should not be maintained by the brutal
internal repression of a people in violation of its right to self
determination. That right requires that there be internal political
space for the free pursuit of a people’s social, economic and
cultural development. But both international law and political
reality will ensure that only a severe violation of that right
–colonialism or equivalent subjugation – will trigger the external
one.
Where secession claims are advanced, they should be addressed
through peaceful, orderly processes. Secession should preferably be
effected under domestic law: if the constitution - or, as in the
case of Sudan - a Peace Agreement - provides for a secession
mechanism this is the obvious path to follow. In the absence of a
prescribed process, however, secession could still be effected
consensually, with international actors supporting bi-lateral
peaceful initiatives. The “velvet divorce” between Czechs and
Slovaks is a good example.
Absent a consensual, negotiated successful process, however, I
suggest that the international community should support a
secessionist enterprise when the legal conditions are fulfilled, and
when it is otherwise appropriate to do so. For the remainder of my
time this morning, I would like to explore some of the other factors
at play – and which often influence Crisis Group’s position – in
determining whether or not secession is advisable. But I wish to
stress at the outset that the international community should not
support the forceful repression of legitimate secessionist claims,
unless these claims are themselves advanced by the illegitimate use
of force.
The first of these criteria is one of last resort. As already
discussed, claims of self determination should, ideally, be resolved
within the framework of existing states. Generally we support
indepe ndence only when there is no hope for the conflict to be
resolved or the right to self determina tion realised within
existing borders. In the case of Kosovo, for example, especially
after the 1999 war, it would be impossible to promote greater
Kosovar self-determination with the framework of the Yugoslav or
Serbian state. Independence for Kosovo is the only solution likely
to lead to last ing stability in the region.
In the case of Somaliland, insistence
by the African Union on the incre asingly abstract notion of
the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Rep ublic,
with Somalila nders governed again from Mogadishu, is both
unrealistic and unsupported by more than twenty years of state
practice. Any attempt to re-impose centralized control by Mogadishu
would almost certainly open a new chapter in the Somali civil war.
A second principle is one of popular support. The Kosovo Albanians’
overwhelming support for independence is a key factor there.
Questions of secession should be decided democratically – as in the
Montenegro referendum in 2005 or the forthcoming self-determination
referendum in Sudan. Crisis Group often draws attention to disparity
between the more extreme claims of secessionist leaders and the
frequently more moderate views of wider populations, who may be more
realistic in their aspirations. The Supreme Court of Canada, for
example, insisted that a secession referendum would require, at a
minimum, a “clear majority” answering a “clear question”. It is
important also to consider the rights of the minorities within the
secessionist minority, and the likelihood that their rights would be
adequately protected within the newly separated state. Secession may
provoke population displacements and further unrest if the newly
created nation state is unwilling or unable to accommodate its own
newly created national minorities.
It is in that sense that I understand the claim that sovereignty has
to be earned. In general term s , I do not subscribe to the notion
that fundamental human rights have to be earned. Yet
Somalil and’s democratic trajectory and
functioning institutions bolster the legitimacy of its claims to ind
ependence. Similarly, ahead of Montenegro’s referendum in 2005 we
argued that Montene gro was “the only republic of the former
Yugoslavia that has formed a genuinely multiethnic gove rnment
without internal conflict”, which strengthened the Montenegrin
claims. Conversely, the Tamil Tigers brutal rule of Tamil areas,
their atrocities – including ethnic cleansing and massacres – and
their treatment of the Muslim minority do little to further Tamil
secessionist claims.
A related concern is that of state feasibility. Can a territorial
claim easily be asserted within existing or easily defined
boundaries? Can the aspiring state become economically viable? I am
careful here not to require economic viability at the outset, since
many developing countries are not themselves currently economically
self-sufficient and depend on international assistance for a large
part of their annual budgets. The question is whether there is any
realistic prospect of self-sufficiency, for instance through the
exploitation of natural resources, even if considerable assistance
will be required at the outset.
Moving further away from the legal entitlement to secession to the
political reality of the need for political international
recognition, one would have to consider the question of regional
dynamics and precedents. Our calls on the African Union to engage
positively with the question of recognition of Somaliland, our
analysis of regional perspectives on the potential South Sudanese
secession, and our advocacy of constructive EU engagement in the
Balkans are examples.
Finally, a host of intangible factors will come into play: history,
culture, language, religion, emotional - some will say irrational -
aspirations, grievances, loyalties - all these will come into the
mix of initiatives and responses that may either support or thwart
secessionist projects.
International actors would be wise to remember the warning in the
preamble of the UDHR that people will turn to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression unless they are protected by the rule of law.
They should therefore make every effort to promote the full respect
of the right of peoples to self-determination by national
governments. In order to avoid the emergence of legitimate
secessionist claims, states must recognize legitimate grievances by
their national minorities, and address them appropriately, including
by providing some form of political autonomy, if appropriate, but
certainly by ensuring political participation, as well as social,
economic and cultural protections.
Inclusive governance, the best prophylactic against many types of
conflicts, also provides the best protection against secession
claims surfacing, and turning violent, in the first place. But even
if they do turn violent, faced with a total breakdown of the rule of
law, the international community cannot blindly support the monopoly
over the use of force by governments who have forfeited any
legitimate entitlement to such monopoly.
Source:UNPO
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