Independent South Sudan is expected to grant diplomatic recognition
to Somaliland
2011-01-03
STRASBOURG – In the 1990’s, the world averted its eyes to genocide
in Rwanda, and to the “Gre at Lakes War” in eastern Congo,
which claimed upward of five million lives – the most in any war
since World War II. Will such silence and neglect prevail again if
civil war is renewed in Sudan?
The peace deal struck in Naivasha, Kenya in 2005 between Sudan’s
government and rebels from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM) committed both sides, at war for most of the previous 50
years, to work for unity. But, as the so-called Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) reaches its climax, the SPLM, based in the
autonomous region of South Sudan, has aband oned all pretense
that unity with the North and the government in Khartoum is either
possible or desirable.
A referendum scheduled for January 9 will give voters in the South
the opportunity to create th eir own sovereign state. A
separate but simultaneous vote in the oil-rich province of Abyei
will allow voters to choose if they want to join the North or South.
The artificial fusion of the mainly Arab, Muslim north of Sudan and
the African south, where Chri stianity and traditional animist
beliefs are predominant, has been an abject failure. Since Sudan won
independence from the United Kingdom in 1956, the country has been
convulsed by almost constant civil war based on the north-south
cultural and religious divide. Matters were subseq uently
complicated by a separate conflict – this time between Muslims –
over resources in the western Darfur region.
If the non-Muslim South had gained at independence a large degree of
religious, cultural, and administrative autonomy within a devolved
federal structure, it is conceivable that the country could have
remained at peace. But the South gained these freedoms only in 2005,
with the CPA, and only after a huge and bloody conflict.
For most of the previous half-century, the North sought relentlessly
to impose its will on the South. Southerners were subject to
systematic and institutionalized marginalization. Islamization was
the main tool of repression, in particular the imposition of Sharia
law. More than two million people were killed in the second Sudanese
civil war alone, which broke out in 1983 (essentially continuing the
first war, which ended in 1972). Millions more became refugees.
Few places on earth are poorer and more destitute than southern
Sudan. In most places, infrastructure is non-existent and millions
of unexploded landmines litter the soil. But the South was never
conquered, and its army, the SPLA, twice fought the North to a
standstill.
The case for South Sudan’s independence is bolstered by the fact
that it would be economically sustainable. Some 80% of Sudan’s oil
is in the South, and the country’s vast swaths of fertile, naturally
irrigated land hold much promise for commercial agriculture. South
Sudan’s mineral wealth could also be substantial, though no one
knows because exploration has been impossible for so long.
All polls suggest that, given the choice in a free, fair, and
well-organized referendum, southerners will vote overwhelmingly for
independence. But the run-up to the plebiscite has been fraught,
with Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the
International Criminal Court on charges of genocide in Darfur,
seeking to delay, disrupt, and overshadow it.
The North has been orchestrating a series of small-scale military
strikes on South Sudanese territory in the past few months. It is
also suspected of drilling horizontally into the South’s oil fields,
in defiance of the CPA. And the SPLM fears that Bashir would use a
vote in favor of independence in the south as justification to
resume all-out war.
War, however, is in no one’s interests, not even Bashir’s. After
all, he relies on oil for government revenue, and, according to
recent leaks, is allegedly accumulating a massive personal fortune
overseas. Bashir knows the tenacity and persistence of the SPLA. But
if the SPLA ends up controlling or shutting down most of Sudan’s oil
resources, the North could end up with nothing.
Renewed conflict could also drag in the United States (supporting
the South) and China (Bashir’s key international backer) into a
dangerous and potentially escalating proxy conflict of the kind that
was common in Africa throughout the Cold War. China has been
investing heavily recently in neighboring Ethiopia in the hope of
buying neutrality from Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in the event of
war, though the government in Addis Ababa is more likely to side
with its Christian co-religionists in the South.
It is the prospect of a proxy war that makes all the unsettled
issues – the division of oil revenue, the demarcation of the border,
and the fate of the adjoining Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile
region – so potentially explosive. But, proxy war or not, this
almost unprecedented redrawing of Africa’s colonial borders (Eritrea
two decades ago was the last example) could have profound
consequences for the continent’s future.
An independent South Sudan would force the West to confront
established orthodoxies about Africa, in particular the belief that
countries like Somalia and Nigeria are more stable whole than they
would be in two or more constituent parts. Indeed, an independent
South Sudan is expected to grant diplomatic recognition to
Somaliland, the successful and stable former British protectorate
that has had de facto independence from the rest of Somalia since
1991.
As Sudan’s referendum approaches, the world holds its breath.
Undoubtedly, South Sudan would face colossal challenges as a
sovereign state, but the alternative – an inevitable return to war –
would be incalculably worse, both for Sudan and for Africa. The
people of South Sudan now have a chance finally to decide their own
destiny. For them, and for the cause of lasting peace in the region,
that could be an immensely valuable start to the new year.
Charles Tannock is Coordinator for the European Conservatives and
Reformists on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European
Parliament.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.
www.project-syndicate.org
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