If recognition comes,
the Somaliland city of Berbera with its deep-sea port is
well-positioned to
Written by J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.
Dec 03, 2008 at 04:16 PM
Strategic Interests
World Defense Review columnist
Somalia: The Times They Are A-Changin'
In the two months since I last focused this column on the challenge
posed by attacks on shipping off the Somali coast, pleading that
"the time has come for responsible powers in the international
community to develop an integrated strategy to cope with the
worsening piracy, one that begins with declaring open season on the
seaborne marauders whom admiralty law has long branded hostes humani
generis, enemies of mankind," the situation has gone from bad to
worse.
With six weeks still left in the year, the number of attacks in 2008
is already nearly triple that of last year, with the marauders
assaulting over ninety ships. On September 25, just two days after
my aforementioned column appeared, Somali pirates took control of a
Ukrainian-owned, Belizean-registered freighter, the MV Faina, which
was carrying thirty-three refurbished Russian-made T-72 tanks and
other armaments, officially destined for Kenya, but reportedly
ultimately bound for South Sudan. The hijackers originally demanded
a $35 million ransom, although they discounted it to $20 million
when United States Navy warships operating nearby in the Arabian Sea
– subsequently joined by the Russian fleet's most modern frigate,
the Neustrashimy – surrounded the vessel to prevent the lethal cargo
from being off-loaded while steamed to the region from the Baltic.
That stand-off continues, as does the captivity of the kidnapped
crew of seventeen Ukrainians, two Russians, and one Latvian (another
Russian, Captain Vladimir Kolobkov, died of a heart attack after his
ship was seized, although his remains are likewise still being held
by the Somali pirates).
Last Sunday, November 16, the pirates made an even bigger catch. The
MV Sirius Star, a Liberian-flagged very large crude carrier (VLCC)
owned by a United Arab Emirates-based subsidiary of Saudi Aramco,
the state-owned national oil company of Saudi Arabia, was seized
along with its twenty-five-member crew of Britons, Croatians,
Filipinos, Poles, and Saudis by Somali raiders some 450 nautical
miles southeast of the Kenyan port of Mombasa. Speaking at a press
conference at the Pentagon, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, even admitted that he was "stunned" by
the range capacity demonstrated by the attackers. The 330
meter-long, 318,000 deadweight-ton vessel, which was launched a
little more than six months ago, is not only the largest ever
captured by the pirates, but also their most valuable prize to date:
in the Sirius Star's hold are some two million barrels of oil bound
for the United States, a cargo worth more than $100 million; the
virtually brand-new ship itself reported carried a price tag of $150
million. At last report, the supertanker was off the port of
Xarardheere, south of Eyl, the notorious pirate haven in the
northeastern Somali region of Puntland where many pirated vessels
have been taken and where the Sirius Star may ultimately be anchored
by its captors. Meanwhile, news of the hijacking on Monday caused
oil prices worldwide to jump a dollar, rebounding from what had been
a nearly 22-month low.
And the capture of the Faina and the Sirius Star just happen to be
the pièces de la résistance. Other incidents recorded in just the
last week include the following:
November 11: British commandos on two launches from the Type 22
frigate HMS Cumberland exchanged fire with pirate vessels
intercepted while trying to attack the Dutch cargo ship MV Powerful,
killing two of the Somalis and driving the rest off.
November 11: Elite marine commandos of the Indian Navy operating off
of the INS Tabar, a Talwar-class frigate patrolling near the Gulf of
Aden, repelled attempted pirate attacks on the Saudi-registered
merchant vessel MV Timaha and the Indian-owned bulk carrier MV Jag
Arnav.
November 12: A Turkish chemical tanker bound for Mumbai, the MV
Karagol, was hijacked off of Yemen and its fourteen crew members,
all Turkish nationals, seized.
November 13: Pirates hijacked the mainland Chinese fishing boat
Tanyo No. 8 as it was working Kenyan waters off Lamu Island, taking
hostage the crew of twenty-four, including sixteen Chinese, one
Japanese, three Filipinos, and four Vietnamese. At last report, the
boat was off the southern Somali port of Kismayo, a town which has
been in the hands of Islamist insurgents since August.
November 15: The Japanese-owned, Panamanian-registered chemical
tanker MV Chemstar Venus was seized with its crew of five South
Koreans and eighteen Filipinos.
November 15: A helicopter from the Neustrashimy was called upon to
repel an attack on the Saudi merchant ship MV Rabih.
November 18: A Hong Kong-registered cargo ship belonging to
state-owned Iran Ship Lines, the MV Delight, was seized as it
transited the Gulf of Aden en route to the Iranian port of Bandar
Abbas on the Persian Gulf with over 36,000 tons of wheat. Taken
hostage with the vessel was its twenty-five-member crew of Ghanaian,
Indian, Iranian, Pakistani, and Filipino nationals.
November 18: The British tanker MV Trafalgar came under attack by a
pack of eight or nine speedboats carrying heavily armed pirates.
Fortunately for the ship, its distress signal was picked up by the
F122 Bremen-class frigate Karlsruhe, which launched a Sea Lynx
helicopter to intercept and drive off the marauders.
November 19: The INS Tabar was fired upon while challenging a
suspected pirate "mother ship" some 285 nautical miles southwest of
the Omani port of Salalah. The Indian frigate sunk the pirates'
boat, although some of the outlaws managed to escape on two
speedboats.
November 19: Although the details were still sketchy, sources in the
region report that pirates have seized two more vessels, a Greek
bulk carrier and a Thai fishing boat.
That pirate attacks are proliferating off the Somali coast should
not surprise anyone. The internationally-unrecognized Republic of
Somaliland in the northwestern part of the onetime Somali Democratic
Republic being a case apart, the Texas-sized territory at the
geopolitically strategic tip of the Horn of Africa has been without
an effective government since 1991. As I warned three months ago,
the "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG) which purports to rule
the country is on the verge of collapsing in the face a growing
insurgency spearheaded by a Somali Islamist group, al-Shabaab ("the
Youth"), which was earlier this year was formally designated a
"foreign terrorist organization" by the U.S. State Department on
account of its al-Qaeda links. The TFG barely controls a few heavily
fortified blocks in Mogadishu and one provincial town, Baidoa, where
its rump parliamentary assembly camps out – and that much only
because it is propped up by a large, albeit increasingly war-weary,
Ethiopian military force that is already beginning to quietly
withdraw. Last week, al-Shabaab forces captured the key port of
Merka, just 100 kilometers south of Mogadishu, without even firing a
bullet. Insurgent units are reported to be massing just outside
Mogadishu for what might well be a battle for what is left of the
capital. In any event, even if it were not utterly irrelevant as a
political force (except in the minds of the delusional diplomats
constantly "engaging" its squabbling "leaders"), the TFG is hardly a
partner for any anti-piracy effort: its own deputy minister of ports
has acknowledged that senior officials were "involved or benefiting
from the piracy," most of which originates in the Puntland fiefdom
of "President" Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.
The fact is that piracy is the most lucrative economic activity in
Somalia these days since ship owners – and, reportedly, some
governments – are willing to pay ransoms well in excess of $1
million for the release of their hijacked vessels and seamen.
Moreover Somali piracy is not only increasing in frequency, but also
aggressiveness as the pirates plow part of their proceeds into
upgrades for their arsenals – which now include Man Portable Air
Defense Systems (MANPADS), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) navigation – in the hopes of
landing even larger prizes, prompting a warning from the
authoritative shipping paper of record, Lloyd's List, that ransoms
paid will exceed $50 million this year, encouraging still more
attacks.
Thus from an occasional nuisance just a few years ago when I warned
of the growing menace in the very first column of this series,
Somali piracy has burgeoned into an international problem directly
affecting literally dozens of countries around the globe. Vessels
attacked this year include those flying the flags of literally
dozens of countries, ranging from the People's Republic of China to
the tiny Micronesian state of Kiribati. As of this week, the pirates
were holding for ransom approximately three hundred seamen from some
fifteen countries, among which hapless lot the Filipinos make up
largest single national bloc, their numbers totaling 127 seafarers
following the addition of nineteen co-nationals from the ship's
company of the Sirius Star.
Moreover, it needs to be underscored that the hijacking of the
Sirius Star took place far beyond which was thought to be the range
of the Somali pirates. Previously, the marauders operated primarily
in the Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen and off the northern Somali
coastline. Then improved armaments and tactics permitted them to
expand their reach to up to 250 nautical miles from the Somali
coast. The attack on the Sirius Star in the Indian Ocean east of
Tanzania, however, revealed an entirely new operational capacity,
one which may have been adopted in response to stepped-up naval
patrols by the United States, several European nations, as well as
Asian countries like Malaysia and India, which are asserting
themselves militarily so far from home waters for the first time.
Consequently insurance premiums for commercial shipping anywhere
near the Horn of Africa, waters through which a tenth of world's
seaborne petroleum and some 16,000 vessels transit annually, have
soared tenfold this year. Faced with the risks of piracy and the
mounting insurance bills, some transport companies have begun
avoiding the Gulf of Aden-Suez Canal route in favor of the going all
the way around the African continent. In fact, just this week,
Bergen, Norway-based Odfjell, a shipping company with a fleet of 92
vessels, announced that all of its owned, managed, and
time-chartered ships that normally would sail through the Gulf of
Aden will be routed via the Cape of Good Hope. Odfjell's chief
executive office, Terje Storeng said that the firm could "no longer
expose our crews to the risk of being hijacked and held for ransom
by pirates."While the route around the Cape is safer, it also adds
weeks to a typical voyage between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia,
thus running up considerably the costs of both raw materials and
manufactured goods at a time when the global economy is already
under considerable stress.
In addition to choking one of the major arteries of global commerce,
the recent surge in piracy threatens the already precarious
humanitarian situation in the East African subregion. The United
Nations World Food Programme (WFP) currently feeds some 2.4 million
of the approximately 6 million inhabitants of Somalia proper; by the
end of this year, the number of those totally dependent upon food
assistance is expected to grow by about 50 percent to more than 3.6
million as the region faces what WFP Executive Director Josette
Sheeran has warned may be "the worst humanitarian crisis since
1984," when over one million died in the Ethiopian famine. While the
pirates have not been known to purposely target aid shipments, 90
percent of which arrives by sea, the idea that that lifeline is
entirely dependent on their good will is hardly a comforting
prospect.
Perhaps even more worrying is the emerging evidence of ties between
the pirates and the Islamist militants fighting the TFG, its
Ethiopian backers, and the beleaguered African Union peacekeeping
force of Ugandans and Burundians in Somalia (AMISOM). Sources in the
region agree that the pirates are sharing at least part of the
ransom payments with the militants in exchange for being given a
free hand in their maritime predations, the money going to finance
deadly attacks which have increasingly included some of the same
non-conventional tactics that foreign jihadisLimburg took place in
the very waters of the Gulf of Aden where the Somali pirates
currently operate and imagine the impact on the global economy if
the attackers were to switch from hijacking commercial shipping to
trying sink it (see my analysis two years ago of how maritime
vulnerabilities might be exploited in a terrorist campaign of
economic warfare). and Sunni Arab insurgents pioneered to great
effect in Iraq before the American surge last year. In a worst-case
scenario, the pirates could conceivably transmogrify into active
agents of international terrorism. Recall that those who
masterminded the 1997 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, are currently hiding in
Somalia and that al-Qaeda's 2002 attack on the French-flagged oil
tanker MV
Ultimately, as I noted in the New Atlanticist policy blog of the
Atlantic Council of the United States shortly after the taking of
the Faina, the problem of Somali lawlessness at sea will only be
definitively resolved when the international community summons up
the political will to adequately address the underlying pathology of
Somali statelessness onshore. Unfortunately, the two months since I
made that assertion have seen little evidence of any movement in
that direction. So, while the capture of Western hostages might
attract a relatively more robust military response (twice this year
alone France has had to dispatch naval special forces from the elite
Commando Hubert to rescue hijacked French yachters and arrest their
pirate captors) as might especially spectacular heists like the
seizure of the Faina with its cargo of arms or – although it remains
to be seen – that of the Sirius Star with its cargo equivalent of
one-quarter of Saudi Arabia's daily oil production, the Somali
pirates have too much to gain to give up their hitherto hugely
profitable activities.
Quite bluntly, there are too few naval resources in the region and
those that are present have had their hands full interdicting
terrorist movements and weapons proliferation; systematically
rooting out pirates is simply not going to be a first-order priority
as long there is a war on terrorism. Quite frankly, no one expects
this state of affairs to change much despite the proclamation in
August of a "Maritime Security Patrol Area" (MPSA) to be patrolled
by coalition vessels, the announcement a month later by the European
Union that it would establish a coordination unit as a tentative
first step towards what will be the first-ever European naval
operation as such, and the unanimous passage last month of yet
another UN Security Council Resolution expressing the body's "grave
concern" and calling upon "States interested in the security of
maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against
piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia."
While the United States maintains its largest military base in
Africa, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti, just next door to the failed
Somali state, the mission of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa (CJTF-HOA) is a long-term strategy aimed at combating
extremism (albeit occasionally there does arise the need to hunt
down specific terrorists), not providing escorts for merchant
vessels. As for coalition naval forces in the region, U.S. Vice
Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of Combined Maritime Forces, has
gone on the record to declare: "The Coalition does not have the
resources to provide 24-hour protection for the vast number of
merchant vessels in the region. The shipping companies must take
measures to defend their vessels and their crews." And, speaking in
Washington, Admiral Mullen raised concerns about the legal framework
for using the Navy to combat the pirates: "We have the authorities
that we need; we have the rules of engagement that we need right
now. One of the challenges that ... you have in piracy clearly is,
if you are intervening and you capture pirates, is there a path to
prosecute them? And that's something I think the international
community has got to answer for the long run."
Consequently, commercial shipping might want to consider how to
better prepared to protect itself. While some owners have invested
in alarm systems, close-circuit television, electric fences, and
even an occasional guard to counter the threat to their vessels,
unfortunately many have done little aside from being prepared to pay
ransoms which only perpetuate the cycle of violence. Instead, ship
owners' associations and seamen's unions, both of which hitherto
have limited their collective action to appeals for someone to "do
something," would do well to spend their energies developing, in
consultation with security professionals, minimum safety and
security protocols for their activities in these dangerous waters.
Port security also needs to be beefed up as it is increasingly
apparent that the pirates are not mere opportunists, but coordinate
their attacks on the basis of intelligence obtained from a worldwide
network of informants. And while the question of placing armed
personnel aboard commercial shipping is a complex one, members of
the relatively clubby international shipping industry might find
that it is far more economical to pool their resources and arrange
escorts – which need not necessarily be on the same vessels they are
protecting – via agreed-upon sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden and
the Arabian Sea than to sail individually around the Cape of Good
Hope. This last idea has received support from high-ranking military
officers, including the Royal Navy's senior commander in the Gulf of
Aden, Commodore Keith Winstanley, who told the Telegraph last month
that armed security detachments from private companies should be
used as a "visual deterrence" to pirates: "It is a measure we are
encouraging people to at least consider."
International relief organizations might also consider the merits of
not having to rely on ad hoc appeals for security assistance from
national militaries. Earlier this year, the WFP was forced to
suspend emergency food deliveries to Somalia for two months, just
because the Netherlands completed its naval escort mission, but no
other country had stepped forward to assume the responsibility.
Canada eventually sent a frigate, HMCS Ville de Québec, but that
deployment was set to end in September. After a last-minute appeal
from the UN, Ottawa extended the assignment by another month – but
no later – to give the aid agencies a chance to find a replacement
naval escort. After the some wrangling, the Dutch were persuaded to
take up the task again, at least through November, with the De Zeven
Provinciën-class frigate HNLMS De Ruyter currently shadowing WFP-chartered
vessels ferrying food into the port of Mogadishu. It would be better
all the way around if the uncertainty surrounding security for
critical humanitarian operations could be eliminated and, hence, the
gaps in food and other deliveries avoided altogether.
The Republic of Somaliland, too, cut off from direct
military-to-military assistance because of its unrecognized status
in the international community, might also find in the private
sector the technical and logistical assistance it needs to continue
to maintain its waters off its 740-kilometer coastline on the Gulf
of Aden free of the maritime outlaws from its neighbor to the east.
While its resources are limited because of its unjust banishment
from community of sovereign nations (see both my call last year,
premised on strategic interests, for U.S. recognition of Somaliland
as well as my outline earlier this year of a "road map" ahead for
the Republic's leaders), one of the most solid arguments that that
Somalilanders have in their favor is the relatively tranquility and
rule of law in which they have maintained for themselves – the three
al-Shabaab-linked suicide bombers who struck the Somaliland capital
of Hargeisa late last month were the exception, rather than the rule
– while their Somali neighbors have collapsed into violence and
chaos. That hard-won reputation is one worth protecting at all
costs, not only for its own sake, but because, if recognition comes,
the Somaliland city of Berbera with its deep-sea port is
well-positioned to recapture its place as a major regional shipping
hub and a veritable engine of economic activity (as a historic trade
center, Berbera was known to classical Greek mariners and Tang
Dynasty merchants alike).
Of course, it needs to be clearly understood that having the private
security sector fill the gap between such responses conventional
military forces are willing and able to provide and the rather
limited capacities of the commercial shipping industry is, at most,
an interim solution, not a long-term fix (for some indicators of the
latter, see the six broad measures I outlined previously). However,
in the midst of the tempest brewing off the Horn of Africa, anything
that calms the waters, however slightly, represents significant
progress.
— J. Peter Pham is Director of the Nelson Institute for
International and Public Affairs at James Madison University in
Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for
the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C., as well as Vice
President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and
Africa (ASMEA). In addition to the study of terrorism and political
violence, his research interests lie at the intersection of
international relations, international law, political theory, and
ethics, with particular concentrations on the implications for
United States foreign policy and African states as well as religion
and global politics.
Dr. Pham is the author of over two hundred essays and reviews on a
wide variety of subjects in scholarly and opinion journals on both
sides of the Atlantic and the author, editor, or translator of over
a dozen books. Among his recent publications are(Reed Press, 2004),
which has been critically acclaimed by Foreign Affairs, Worldview,
Wilson Quarterly, American Foreign Policy Interests, and other
scholarly publications, and Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The
Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy (Nova Science
Publishers, 2005). Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State
In addition to serving on the boards of several international and
national think tanks and journals, Dr. Pham has testified before the
U.S. Congress and conducted briefings or consulted for both
Congressional and Executive agencies. He is also a frequent
contributor to National Review Online's military blog, The Tank.
© 2008 J. Peter Pham
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