Somali Nationalism: Not Dead, Just Different

I write with reference to Peter Lockwood’s piece
entitled “Somali Nationalism: A Dead Conce pt?” published
on 9th January. I don’t usually respond to articles,
however this one demand ed a resp onse for several
reasons:
• Firstly, Mr. Lockwood is a Junior Consultant at UNESCO
in Nairobi and has written other piec es on Somali
politics that have been published. Thus, he is part of
the international bureaucr acy that is responsible for
administering Somalia and, notwithstanding his current,
if somewh at bizarre, de signation of “Junior Consultant”,
is likely to become a member of the internatio nal
nomenclature recognised as ‘Somalia experts’. Thus, his
views and perspectives on Somali politics are likely to
ha ve an impact upon international policy on Somalia and
need to be addr essed as such.
• Secondly, while the title of the piece raises the
question of Somali Nationalism, the piece is actu ally
concerned with the disintegration of the Somali Republic
and argues that Puntland (the auto nomous and relatively
peaceful part of the erstwhile Republic) and Somaliland
shoul d help in ensu ring that south and central Somalia
do not become “…pawn(s) of other region al and
international powers.”. This argument echoes those put
forward at the roundtable mee ting held by Chatham H ouse
in July last year, and the policies of the current Silanyo administ ration in Hargeisa, that Som aliland
should get involved in the search for the establishment
of a viable state in Somalia.
•
Thirdly, the piece seems to argue for the
re-establishment of the erstwhile Republic of Som alia,
while not explicitly coming out for this position. In
the concluding paragraph, Mr. Lockwoo d seems to posit
the idea that Islam can provide the basis of a new
Somali Nationalism that s upersedes the divisive clan
identity that he believes continues to bedevil the
search for peac e and viable govern ance in Somalia.
From the outset, let me extend my appreciation to Mr.
Lockwood for championing Somali self deter mination and
independent statehood. This critique of his piece is not
meant to impugn his motives, nor question the morality
of his intentions. However, his perspectives, and
there fore his prescrip t ions, suffer from a limited
knowledge of Somali history and nationalism. Firstly, he
does not seem to understand fully that the clan identity
of the Somali people has both a fusion as well as a
fissio n tendency. Indeed it is the sense of Somali-ness
(evidencing their common language, religion and culture)
which distinguishes the Somali people of the Horn of
Africa from their neighbours, be the se neighbours Oromos,
Amharas, Danakil (Afars), Masai or Kikuyu. It is this
fusion tendency which gave rise to modern Somali
nationalism during the 20th century and underpinned the
dream of Gr eater Somalia and the creation of the
erstwhile Republic. Thus, automatically equating clan
ident ity with divisiveness, i.e. the fission tendency,
is a major flaw in Mr. Lockwood’s understanding of
Somali nationalism and, therefore, of the analysis
presented.
Another glaring weakness in the analysis is equating
Puntland and Somaliland in the context of th eir
respective positions regarding the efforts to establish
a functioning government and state str ucture in Somalia
during the last two decades. Puntland has not declared
independe nce from Som alia and has been intimately
involved from the beginning in the establishment of
successive so-ca lled governments in Mogadishu. Indeed,
the late Abdillahi Yusuf, the first Pr esident of Puntland, m ounted a successful campaign to accede to the
Presidency of Somalia in 2004. Further, Puntland has
been very vociferous in demanding and securing its share
of, and from, every government th at has been established
for Somalia since the collapse of the Siyad Barre
dictatorship, whether such ‘share’ be cabinet positions
or allocations of aid. The latest conference (which
concluded ea rlier this month) to determine the
government of Som alia after the term of the current TFG
en ds in August 2012, was held in Garowe, the capital of
Puntland. Thus, it is only Somaliland which has remained
aloof from the search for a governm ent for Somalia and
this is because the successive ‘governments’ established
for Somalia hav e myopically insisted upon their dominion
over what is in effect a separate country.
Yet another weakness in the analysis is the misreading
of the brief period of relative peace and unity under
the rule of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) during
2006/7. Mr. Lockwood suffe rs under the impression that
it was the Islamist doctrine of the ICU that won over
the suppo rt of the peo ple, when it was their perceived
personal honesty, civic morality, patriotism and
judicial impartia lity compared with the venality,
brutality and foreign loyalties of the warlords they
sought to tran splant that generated widespread public
support and loyalty. The irony is that it was precisely
the alien and medieval nature of the ICU’s brand of
Islamism, with its banning of innocent pursuits su ch as
watching sports on TV (indeed watching TV at all),
wearing of bras by women and the shav ing of beards by
men, that brought them into conflict with the general
public. Indeed, one could argue that the ICU was able to
secure widespread public support by espousing and
practising man y of the virtues of Somali nationalism,
i.e. clean, accountable government, the rule of law and eq uality before it that characterised the independence
era.
The statement by Hassan Aweys that Mr. Lockwood quotes
approvingly in his penultimate para graph laying claim to
Ethiopia’s Fifth (Somali) Province and the Northern
Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya actually represents the
very worst of the ICU, and marks the takeover of the
group by the extremist wing that would lead to its
downfall. This extremist wing, of course, came out of
the closet as Al-Shabaab after the success of its plan
to takeover the ICU and engineer a confrontati on with
Ethiopia and its Western backers. The simple fact is
that the political calculus underlying the collapse of
the state in Somalia cannot be reduced to the sed uctive
simplicity of clan identity = divisive anarchy; Islamic
identity = inclusive peace. Indee d, the reality of
Somali political culture demands that this much sought,
and seemingly elusive, inclusive peace must be charted
through the very clan identity that facile analysis
posits as the problem. The primacy of clan identity
within Somali culture and politics is a given that can
be neither wished away nor ignored, nor relegated to the
periphery of political discussion and organisation, and
any prescription or proposed solution that does not
recognise this primacy is but a pipedream.
Somaliland’s recovery of its independence in 1991 and
its establishment of a functioning state wit h a
representative, indigenous system of government across
clan lines is a clear demonst ration that the fusion
tendency of Somali nationalism is alive and well. The
fact that this unre cognised country of limited means is
host to hundreds of thousands of refugees from the
ana rchy south of the border is testament to the potency
of the fraternity that underpins this p an-Somali
identity or nationalism. The pan-Somali nature of much
Somali business, much of w hich has its base in Som aliland where it can thrive in peace and under the
protection of law, also attests to this fraternal and
unifying trend in Somali social organisation.
In conclusion, Mr. Lockwood, Somali nationalism is far
from dead. Indeed, I would posit the op pos ite, that it
getting its second wind (much like a long distance
runner) and we are witnessi ng its re-emergence in a
different and stronger, if less emotive, form. However,
recognising its new formul ation and articulation by a
generation of Somalis that have different imperativ es
and that are ch aracterised as much by their experiences
of war and exile as by the new era of technology and the
primacy of information acquisition and exchange in which
they hav e grown up, will require a more in-depth and
nuanced analysis. As for Somaliland getting inv olved in
the search for peace and governance in Somalia, this is
not a new idea. Indeed, since 1995 Somaliland has
repeatedly offered its services in this endeavour with
the clear understa nding that this will not impact the
legitimacy of its independence.
It has been the myopic and misplaced intransigence of
southern politicians and the unquestio ning, passive
support of this inflexibility by the donor powers that
have conspired to ensure Somalilan d’s distance. Far from
ignoring the plight of their brothers to the south,
Somaliland has sought to broker peace among them in the
only credible way open to it, i.e. by protecting the
hard-won pea ce and stability its own people have
achieved. These efforts have been con sistently sabotaged
by the very same self-seeking politicians that squabble
over apportionm ent of cabinet positions and aid monies,
even as foreign terrorists and their local franchisees
fight over their people and terri tory with invading
armies and US drone attacks. The irony is that among the
ordinary people of S omalia, the independence of
Somaliland is widely supported and admired.
Ahmed M.I. Egal
13 January 2012 |
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