Gleams of Hope among the Clouds Prospects for the Horn of Africa in 2011 by Ahmed M . I . Egal
 

The Horn of Africa region (HOA) has always been strategically important as a vital conduit of east-west and north-south trade, and this has been evidenced by the efforts of global powers to either control the region or maintain cordial relations with rulers there. In the scramble for Africa during last two decades of the 19th century, Britain, France and Italy competed for control over the region with each securing control over some portions. During the Cold War era, the competition between the US and USSR for  influ ence over the regimes that ruled the countries of the region was particularly intense as evidenced by the changing affiliations of successive governments in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen. Over the last two decades the region has developed a reputation as a hotbed of anarchy, terrorism, piracy and  chro nic instability.

The erstwhile Republic of Somalia is the classic example of a failed state and the cast of warlords, miscre an ts and Diaspora carpetbaggers that passes for its government (the ill-named Transitional Federal   Go vern ment [TFG] headed by a woefully miscast and desperately inadequate Quranic school teacher), cont inue to parrot their lines in the black farce into which Somali politics and government has descended. However, in actual reality, the erstwhile Somalia no longer exists with the ex-British Somaliland  Protec torate in the  no rth reasserting the sovereignty it voluntarily surrendered in 1960 to join with the ex-Italian colony to  cre ate the Somali Republic, while other regions within it, e.g. Puntland, Galmudug and portions of Juba River  r egion, have successfully established functioning local administrations, even as the TFG farce continues  apa ce in Mogadishu. Most of the country is in the hands of the Al-Shabaab  ter rorists.

Across the Gulf of Aden, Yemen continues to be bedevilled by widespread unrest due to a host of   seemi ngly intractable problems, viz. an autocratic and authoritarian government that seems to have no  reme dy for the country's deep seated problems other than repression; chronic poverty, malnutrition and the  high est rates of infant mortality and illiteracy in the Arab World; a deep disconnect between the more  cosmo politan south and the traditional, tribal Bedouin society of the north; and, of course, Al-Qaeda  ins pired and sponsored terrorism which has found fertile ground in the poverty, political repression and tri bal affinity endemic to the country. To this heady brew of socio-political instability, the additional  incen diary of  secta rian strife has recently been added with the flare-up in of a Shiite Houthi rebellion in the south-western m ountains that border Saudi Arabia that ended in an uneasy truce in April 2010.

With respect to the other countries of the region, Djibouti and Ethiopia continue to maintain their  relati ve stability, despite widespread claims of autocratic rule and stolen elections levelled against both of  th eir  go vernments. While it is undeniable that both Omar Guelleh (of Djibouti) and Meles Zenawi (of  Ethio pia) have reneged on pledges to step down after a decade of rule and that both leaders are increasingly showing the traits of the ‘strong-man' style of governance they previously derided, it is also true that political  op position to both leaders has been divided, fractious and ineffective in mobilising popular, grass root  oppos ition to depose them. Eritrea continues to steadfastly maintain its unenviable position as the North Korea of Africa, with its Stalinist domestic socio-political structure complete with a robust personality cult of Isaias Afewerki - the President. While there does not seem to be any serious, overt internal opposition to the Afewerki regime, the country remains ostracised internationally for supporting the Al-Shabaab/Hizb Al-Islam terrorists in Somalia in furtherance of its policy of confronting Ethiopia. In addition, Eritrea has managed to engineer its almost complete isolation in Africa and the wider  interna tional community by a disconcerting willingness to wage war against each of its neighbours.

Sudan managed to snatch diplomatic defeat from the jaws of victory after signing the peace agreement  w ith Southern rebels, by initiating another civil war with its citizens in Dharfur. Thankfully, the Dharfur  confli ct seems to be winding down, and the people of southern Sudan are on the verge of the  referend um to determine whether they will secede from Sudan to form their own country or whether they will remain part of Sudan, as agreed in the said peace agreement (the Comprehensive Peace Agreement  [CPA]). It is widely expected that the referendum will result in a massive majority for independent sta tehood, which will underscore not only the history of neglect and victimisation which fuelled the long civil war, but also the inexplicable arrogance of the Bashir regime in flouting nearly all of the provisions of the CPA designed to accommodate southern aspirations and bring them into the mainstream of Sudanese governance and politics. Most impartial observers, while supportive of the right of the people of  southe rn Sudan to  determ ine their future, are very wary of the response of the Bashir regime to a resounding vote for independe nce.

Within this seemingly negative and unremitting overview of the region, there are some significant  glim mers of hope that 2011 may witness the opening of a new chapter in the HOA. Firstly, the African Union (AU), particularly the neighbours of Somalia, is edging to a more rational and realistic approach to the collapse of the state in that unfortunate country. The AU and IGAD (the Inter-Governmental Authority on  Developm ent which groups Somalia's neighbours) have begun to accept the hard reality that the TFG represents no one in Somalia and that it can neither defeat the terrorists of Al-Shabaab nor deliver the peace and  reco nciliation with which it has been charged. Further, the abject failure of the ‘top-down' approach to nati on-building and national reconciliation, which the TFG embodies in all of its  ineffectiven ess and failure, stands in marked contrast with the success of the ‘bottom-up' approach with which  So maliland has established peace, and functioning, representative government with no outside help or int erference.

Thus, increasing numbers of countries in Africa have come to accept the reality of Somaliland's  independ ence, and this as yet unrecognised country can count Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, South Africa, Ghana and Senegal among its supporters within the AU. In addition, in the wake of the Presidential elections held in June this year in which the opposition candidate won and succeeded the losing incumbent in a peaceful and joyous succession, the US and the EU have stated that they will deal with Somaliland directly as a de facto state. In view of Somaliland's history over the last two decades in establishing the HOA's only  fun ctioning, multi-party democratic government, the de jure acceptance of its nationhood status is surely not far off. In the clearest indication to date of IGAD's new realistic and pragmatic approach to  Somalil and, a senior delegation from the organisation visited Hargeisa and held extensive discussions with the country's new President and government in December. Subsequent to the visit, IGAD issued an invitation to the  indepen dent National Election Commission and members of the independent media to observe the referendum in southern Sudan as a Somaliland delegation.

Further, quite separate from recognition of the legitimacy of the country's claim to statehood and the  co nsiderable achievement of its people in establishing peace and rebuilding their country and their lives with their own hands, Somaliland's emergence from the shadows of international diplomacy has a direct and crucial impact upon the search for a solution to the crisis in Somalia to the south. On the one hand,  Somalil and's assistance in the effort to reconcile the warring communities, while marginalising the terrorists, will be invaluable since it brings to the table skills and capabilities that no other party can. On the other, recognition of Somaliland's success in establishing peace, reconciliation, representative  gover nment and a flourishing economy will delegitimize the proponents of violence, terrorism and political  chic anery in  Soma lia. The very cautious steps taken by the AU, IGAD, the US and the EU towards bringing Somaliland into the mainstream of international diplomacy, has already stung the beneficiaries of  Soma lia's anarchy into action, ill advised and counter-productive though such action has been.

Secondly, in southern Sudan it is widely expected that a new nation will emerge in 2011 in the wake of an overwhelming vote for independence in the referendum. This new nation can become a significant ‘game changer' with respect to the diplomatic dynamic in the region by introducing a new player that is friendly to Ethiopia and which can exercise significant control over the Nile waters. At present, the stand-off   be tween Ethiopia and Eritrea remains hostage to various factors, not least of which is the personal distrust and antipathy between the leaders of two countries, however, a crucial factor is the Egyptian policy  (w hich Sudan actively supports) of encircling Ethiopia with hostile neighbours in order to secure  concessio ns with regarding sharing of the waters of the Nile. An independent southern Sudan which is friendly to both  Ethio pia and Eritrea would dramatically change this calculus, while also opening the door for this new nation to act as mediator/honest broker between Addis Ababa and Asmara. The major sticking  poi nt in the stand-off has seemingly been resolved with Ethiopia's agreement in 2007 to hand over Badme and accept the  ru lings of the UN Border Commission in full, yet the two sides remain locked in a sterile impasse. A new inter locutor trusted by both sides could provide the spark required for re-starting the peace negotiations, and a newly independent southern Sudan (possibly with the assistance of an  emer gent Somaliland) could be s uch an interlocutor.

The fact is that the HOA is a major global trouble spot and resolution of its deep seated problems will   re quire a huge amount of effort, goodwill and capital (both political and financial) as well as time. The fact is  th at both international diplomacy and local political mobilisations have important roles to play in this process, and success can only be secured if each is applied/supported judiciously. Thus, the legacy of donor  diplo macy in Somalia over the last two decades has been abject failure. The fact is that the route to stabilising that country and re-establishing the state therein clearly lies in recognising local, political realities and  s eeking to bring the success of Somaliland to bear upon the search for solutions in  Soma lia, and this is be ginning to be accepted by foreign powers. Conversely, in Sudan, notwithstanding the long and very costly civil war, it has been the application of sustained international, diplomatic and  politi cal pressure on  Kharto um that has secured the self determination of the people of southern Sudan.

The hopes for peace and progress in 2011 for the HOA region are clearly and inextricably tied to these  two, nascent countries that are emerging into the diplomatic mainstream through disparate political  pro cess es. The international community should welcome and support these new additions to global politics and  en courage them to play a positive role in stabilising their tough and troubled neighbourhood.