What Went Wrong?
Why southern Somalia Failed and Somaliland Succeeded?
For the past two decades, southern Somalia has been
plagued by sporadic and unrelenting ci vil war,
terrorism, pirates, famine, and wide spread diseases
which claimed the lives of up to 200,000 to 300,000
people. The persistent multifarious ordeals that
ordinary citizens have en dured thus far are widely
reported by the international media as well as
humanitarian agenci es. Since its effects and magnitude
have been extensively scrutinized elsewhere, it is
futile to reiterate in here. There have been fourteen
reconciliation attempts aimed at restoring peace and
stability in southern Somalia but all have failed to
yield the intended objectives. Subsequently, southern
Somalia became, as international community describes it,
a failed sta te due to its manifestation of all its
hallmarks: an ineffective government, widespread
corru ption, lack of public services, prevalent criminal
enterprise, economic decline, and muddled mo vement of
populations.
In sharp contrast to southern Somalia, Somaliland has
successfully constructed the first dem ocratic state of
its kind in the Horn of Africa with emerging
laissez-faire economy. Notwithstanding its challenges,
Somaliland has formulated legal frameworks intended for
the extension of democratic institutions, e.g., various
political parties, free and fair elections, due process
of law, freedom of assembly, freedom of association,
freedom of the press, and, abo ve all, peaceful and
democratic transfer of power. It is indeed an oasis of
peace, democracy and prosperity. How did Somaliland
manage, you may correctly inquire, attain this
unprecede nted triumphant while their counterpart,
southern Somalia, has constantly failed to restore
peace, let alone construct any type of governance?
To provide impartial answer to the aforesaid inquiry,
this short piece strives to scrutinize the underlying
factor that has played significant role for the failure
of southern Somalia as well as the unprecedented success
of Somaliland. Numerous individuals who have attempted
to in spect the fundamental causes of these differences
failed miserably to appreciate and employ the principle
of historical materialism. Historical materialism holds
that in order to unearth the causes of social
phenomenon, it is essential to peel back its
multilayered sequence of events. In other words, to
unearth the initial cause of any phenomenon, it is
crucial to trace its evol ution without falling into the
trap of circular reasoning.
Most analysts in this case, however, portray their
examination as if Somali tribulations have no historical
precedent by focusing chiefly on the effects rather than
the causes. The dire consequence of examining and
concentrating on effects, rather than the causes,
resembles the lethal upshot of a doctor who incorrectly
diagnoses the symptoms of his/her patient(s) and
subscribes improper treatments. The most regurgitated
and blamed effects include, but not limited to:
clan-ism, leadership failure, warlord politics,
terrorism, foreign entities, etc. Although these effects
play a role in Somalia’s tribulations, they are neither
the root causes of southern Somalia’s failure nor
Somaliland’s success. As the doctor analogy illustrates,
focu sing on effects or symptoms rather than the cause
leads to providing or suggesting wrong diagnosis.
This article endeavors to scrutinize the primary
underlying causes of the divergence path th at the two
regions have taken. It argues that the root cause of the
southerners’ failure and Somaliland’s triumph lies
solely on the role, or lack thereof, that traditional
institutions have played in both regions. This argument
examines three epochs: the pre-colonial era wherein
S omali traditional institutions were intact and
functional; the colonial epoch during which Briti sh
colony assisted Somaliland blend the traditional
institutions with modern institutions wher eas Italians
crushed the traditional institutions of southern Somali;
and the post-colonial peri od in which the product of the
colonial legacy manifests itself in both regions. As we
shall se e, the southern Somalis’ traditional
institutions were destroyed by Italian colony whereas
Somaliland ’s survived.
To demonstrate this hypothesis, this article chronicles
briefly the historical trajectory of tra ditional
institutions and the effects of its existence/absence,
which manifests itself through the successful
dialectical manner in which Somalilanders fused their
traditional institutions wi th modern institutions, and
the shattering consequences of the absence of
traditional institu tions in southern Somalia. Before
delving into the deeper discussion, it is essential, at
the out set, to explicate the significance of social
structure through which the crucial role of Somali
traditional institutions shall be examined.
Social institutions
Social institutions refer to an intricate and abiding
social arrangements stemming from endu ring interactions
between individuals/groups which define, regulate,
coerce, punish and rew ard the actions and/or inactions
of individuals and groups. The primary purpose of social
insti tution is to serve its members attain its highest
potential in two ways: 1) to organize its mem bers by
creating strong bond between them through various means,
e.g., clan, tribe, nationa lism, culture, religious
affiliation, and consequently 2) to ward off
collectively any potential threats to its existence,
e.g., diseases, carnivores, out-groups, natural
disasters, etc. Social institutions therefore
effectively organize its members in a way that
encourages an excellent behavior and simultaneously
deters a poor behavior. On the macro level, it refers to
the arra ngements binding individuals and organizations.
On the micro level, it refers to the manner an d extent
to which customs characterize the behavior of
individuals. Through time, these ongo ing patterns of behavior become formally or informally
institutionalized: social and political in stitutions;
economic arrangements; cultural norms; clan; tribe;
nationalism, etc. Therefore, if this social institution
is crushed or destroyed, the society would inevitably
suffer or perish as history attests repeatedly. In the
Somali context, this essential social institutions is
uninterr upted in Somaliland throughout its history,
which assists its state building while southern
So malia’s social institutions was crushed by the Italian
colony, which is the primary cause of the southern
Somalia’s Hobbesian State of Nature.
Somalia’s Pre-colonial Epoch
Prior to the arrival of the European colonizers,
majority of Somalis were mainly nomadic pasto ralists
(and few agro-pastoralists) sparsely scattered over an
arid land where miscellaneous rival clans were
constantly competing over scarce grazing land and water.
Under this harsh environment, each clan strives to outmaneuver other clans in order to gain access to the
sca rce resources. Therefore, it is pivotal for each clan
to unify its members by formulating unspo ken rules aimed
at regulating, coercing, punishing/rewarding the actions
and/or inactions of its members. Somalis fragmented
between and among themselves into patrilineal decent
factions, each of which claiming to originate from a
mythical male ancestor. The clan provides two
indispensable aspects for its members: individual
defense and financial security, which any other
entities, including previous governments, have failed to
substitute. Thus, the clan is indeed the core of
personal identity, social security, insurance, defense
and the fusion and fission of Somali society. Although
Somalis had no centralized political hierarchy, each
clan has its own head known as suldaan, boqor, ugaas or
garaad, whose functions are customarily ceremonial
and/or honorary. The heads of the clans utilize
customary law or social contract, xeer, in conjunction
with traditional meditation practices to settle any
conflicts and disputes that may arise between and/or
among contending rival clans. This acephalous political
system has served impressively the “stateless” Somali
society for centuries. However, during the colonial era
this social arrangement was altered due to the incursion
of colonial powers.
The Colonial Era
During the colonial era, different European
colonizers—British in Somaliland and Italians south ern
Somalia —approached the native Somalis differently. In
Somaliland, the British’s aim was not to colonize
Somaliland per se; hence, Somaliland Protectorate,
whereas the Italian’s prim ary intend was to colonize
southern Somalis; thus, Italian colony. The primary
rationale for the British to come to Somaliland was to
ensure the supply of meat for their soldiers in Aden and
also to prevent other foreign entities from interfering
with their modus operandi. Therefore, the British had no
grand design to settle and create a colony in
Somaliland. The Bri tish clarified their initial
intentions of arriving in Somaliland as follows:
The primary objectives of Government are to secure a
supply market, to check the traffic in slaves, and to
exclude the interference of foreign powers. It is
consistent with these objectiv es, and with the
protectorate, which the Indian Government has assumed,
to interfere as litt le as possible with the customs of
the people [Somalilanders], and to have them administer
their own internal affairs.[i]
Consequently, the British employed indirect rule by
incorporating Somaliland’s traditional aut hority into
the governing system. Through the indirect rule,
Somaliland elders were made pa rt and parcel of the state
and assumed diverse titles, e.g., chiefs, caaqilo,
receiving governm ent stipend. Others were incorporated
into the government as judges, Qaadiyo, presiding loc al
courts and their authority was reinforced with local
police officers, Illaaho. Therefore, Briti sh did not
crush Somaliland’s traditional institutions but rather
introduced the incorporation of traditional- and
modern-institutions. This was however different from how
Italians approa ched their colonial endeavors in Somalia.
Unlike the British, Italian colony’s chief intent was to
create fully flagged colony in the entire southern
Somalia and occupy the coast as well as the agricultural
hinterland. Although Itali ans and southern Somali elders
signed leasehold agreements, Italians abrogated all the
agre ements realizing that these agreements hindered
their colonial agenda. Therefore, they laun ched their preplanned agenda of subjugating their subjects by
crushing traditional institut ions. In order to
efficiently subdue their subjects, Italian fascist
regime in 1923, led by Benn ito Mussolini, utilized the
horrendous direct rule, or kolonya system, intended to
achieve thr ee objectives: first, to wholly wipe out
traditional institutions of southern Somalis; secondly,
to confiscate forcibly all the fertile land without any
compensation; and thirdly, to enslave southerners in
order to provide free labor. For instance, the Duca
degli Abruzzi was an agric ultural settlement for Italian
colony and, within a short period of time, 200 Italians
settled in sixteen villages enslaving 3000 southern
Somalis.
Colonial appointments, heavy taxation, and rapid
excessive expropriation of lands diminished the power of
clan elders and gradually crushed the traditional
institutions of southerners. Realizing that they
emasculated the traditional institutions, Italians
immediately commenced agricultural projects focused
mainly on banana and sugarcane. The initial irrigation
canals erected for these agricultural projects were
canal Afraad, Asayle, Shiikhaal, and Dawaddeed. Due to
the free labor of the colonized Somalis, the production
of banana skyrocketed from 3,975 hectares to 7,400
hectares in 1936 to 1955 respectively. In order to
humiliate southe rn Somalis, Italians intermingled with
natives marrying and/or raping Somali girls, which was
degrading to southern Somalis. At the end, Italians
successfully altered the southern Somal i’s traditional
institutions.
Post-colonial Period
As mentioned above, the diverse manner in which British
and Italy approached Somaliland and southern Somalia
respectively defined the widely divergent paths the two
countries have taken. At the dawn of independence, new
malfeasance and inept elite groups emerged in both
countries. The members of the new elite group were
either previously employed by the colonial powers or
acquired minimal education overseas. On the one hand,
they were well versed the traditional pastoral ethos
which provided them the savoir faire of their peoples’
aspirations, fears, and sorrows. On the other hand,
their acquired minimal education and/or experience
gained during their employment under the colonial
governments afforded them to make inroads upon the newly
independent state and its material rewards. The former
provid ed them the knowledge of their people and the
later offered them the claim of legitimacy of being the
sole experts of how to run the affairs of the state.
Although they share similar characteristics, these new
elites took opposing pathways in sout hern Somalia and
Somaliland. In southern Somalia, since the Italians
crushed the authority of the chiefs and departed, new
elite group emerged who replaced the Italian colonizers
due to the absence of traditional leaders. The new elite
group, who were representing neither the interests of
their respective clan(s) nor the interest of the general
populace, became the solitary authority in southern
Somalia. In Somaliland, a similar elite group emerged
whose power was limited to military, political, and
civil services. The Somaliland’s new elite group was not
the only authority in the country because traditional
leaders’ authority reigned supreme and transcended all
other authorities. Recall, in Somaliland diverse clans
have their respective chiefs who hitherto successfully
managed the affairs between and among clans and had
acquired minimum experiences of government affairs. In a
nutshell, southern Somalia was controlled solely by new
elites who were unaccountable to anyone while Somaliland
was administered by a similar elites but under the
watchful eyes of chiefs—the powerful and unchallenged
traditional leaders. This difference sealed the fate of
the two countries in post independence era.
Independence
Somaliland gained its independence on June 26, 1960 from
British while southern Somalia achi eved on July 1, 1960.
Somaliland had remained independent state for five days
and was reco gnized by the United Nations and thirty-five
states. As a sovereign state, deeply ingrained with
nationalistic fervor, Somalilanders voluntarily and
hastily merged with southern Somalia without any
preconditions and gambled on the future of their
inhabitants. Some leaders advo cated for the postponement
of the union; namely, Michael Mariano, Garaad Cali
Garaad Jaa mac Mohamed H. Ibrahim Egal and many others,
but to no avail. The ill-prepared and hurried
pronouncement of the union had left unforgettable
devastating marks on every aspect of Somalilanders, be
it economically, socially, and politically.
The newly formed union inherited two distinct civil
services systems due to the aforesaid dif ferent
approaches of British and Italians. In Somaliland,
British established and left behind sk illed and
competent civil servants. British required its civil
servants obtain certificates or deg rees in order to be
considered for employment. In southern Somalia, Italians
were not intere sted establishing similar competent civil
servants in the south and left behind unorganized,
frenzied, and corrupt bureaucrats. Due to the
contrasting systems of the two countries, clash of
political cultures and injustice was foreseeable.
Although Somalilanders’ grievances are varied and
numerous, it will suffice here to draw attention to
pertinent aspects.
As soon as the union materialized, discontent had
engulfed Somalilanders due to the realizat ion of the
uneven and inequitable share of power. Southern Somalia
egoistically held onto the:
1. President
2. Prime minster (Egal’s term in 1967 was not allocated
to Somalilanders, but he won
due to his political aptitude)
3. Majority of cabinet ministers
4. Majority of the National Assembly (123 members: only
33 for Somalilanders)
5. Commander of the military
6. Commander of the police
7. Capital city
8. Union flag
9. Ruling party SYL; the three Somaliland political
parties—NUF, SNL, and USP—were marginalized and reduced
to insignificance.
Somalilanders’ first dissatisfaction came into view when
President Adan Abdulle Osman nomin ated Abdirashid Ali
Sharmarke as Prime Minister. They anticipated that
Somalilanders would obtain the premiership since
southerners took many of major positions. However, it
turned out to be that southern Somalis considered
Somalilanders unwanted intruders disturbing the ir newly
acquired independence.
The civilian government under the leadership of
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke levied higher taxes on
Somalilanders and reduced the salary of their military
and civil services while southerners were enjoying lower
taxes and higher salaries of their military and civil
services. Knowing th at they were minority in the
National Assembly and were unable to win favorable
votes, Som alilanders attempted to present their
grievances to the military and government leaders. Alas
their ingenuous and legitimate complaints fell on deaf
ears. Instead of resolving the issu e, Sharmarke’s
government implemented a decree of siege in Hargeisa
intended to subvert the peaceful mass uprising. The
subsequent government under the leadership of Abdirizak
Haji Hussein dealt with the Somaliland issues harshly
and discourteously. Somalilanders allude to one event in
Hargeisa in which residents turned their backs to
Abdirizak during his visit to express their
disappointment. Abdirizak replied angrily and said ‘that
the sight of those who turned their back to me appear
prettier when seeing them from behind than from front.’
His retort was considered an insult with sexual
connotations, which deeply offended Somalilanders.
The injustices and degrading denial of southern Somalis
infuriated extremely the Somaliland political leaders,
traditional elders, military commanders, intellectuals,
women, students, and business community. The public
resentment incited various segment of the society
renounci ng and withdrawing from the union. A vivid case
in point is the failed coup d’état led by Hass an Kayd, a
graduate from Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain,
which its chief objective was to withdraw from the union
and regain Somaliland ’s independence.
Coup d’état
Due to the apparent mounting corruption, nepotism,
public resentment, and constant failures of the civilian
government, it was effortless for Siad Barre to
instigate his well-articulated co up d’état. Despite his
brutal tyranny across the country, Barre’s government
launched metic ulous systematic genocide, oppression,
clan-ism, economic sanction, frozen state emergency, et
cetera, against Somalilanders. Nonetheless, the manner
in which Barre’s government atte mpted to take advantage
of Somalilanders’ traditional elders and southern
Somali’s elites re veals the palpable variation between
the two regions. Barre realized that the only authority
in the southern Somalia rests on elite groups while the
Somalilanders’ authority rests solely on traditional
leaders, not elite groups. Therefore, in order to
control Somaliland populace, it is essential to empower
and utilize (though unsuccessful) their traditional
leaders; hence, the label nabadoono, peace pioneers, in
order to illustrate the undeniable power of traditional
leaders in Somaliland.
In southern Somalia, the government employed its iron
fist knowing full well that the traditio nal leaders were
absent and they were the solitary authority. Therefore,
they utilized the te rm jaale (comrade) to demonstrate
the lack of traditional authority. Barre’s failed
attempts to exploit Somalilanders’ traditional leaders
assisted in strengthening the position of tradition al
leaders and simultaneously weakening any residual
traditional authority in the south. Both times
Somaliland traditional institutions survived these two
chilling threats; British and Barre while southerners
were ruined. In order to protect its people against the
consistent tyranny of Barre’s government, Somalilanders’
politicians, military personnel, intellectuals, and
elders declared and launched guerrilla war against
Barre’s government leading to regain its independence.
The Civil War
After the eruption of the Somali civil war due to the
ousting of the dictatorial regime, a power vacuum
followed across the country, which enthused a craving to
return to the customary and religious laws in order to
restore a sense of security. In the absence of
authority, an assortment of fierce factions contending
for power and control reared their ugly heads. The
manner in which these contending factions proceeded in
Somaliland and southern Somalia differed. The actual
distinction between the two factions lies on the role of
traditional institutions or lack thereof; political
vision of their organization; the environment they were
operating; and the organizational structure under which
they were functioning. In Somaliland, the emerged
factions belonged primarily to the military leaders and
political wing of the Somali National Movement (SNM)
whereas southern Somalia’s factions were scattered among
ambitious individuals.
Somali National Movement (SNM) vs Southern Factions
Since its inception, the SNM had structured its
organizational structure in a manner consiste nt with the
traditional institutions of Somalilanders. In October
1981, the SNM published poli tical manifesto—“A Better
Alternative”—elucidating its desire for representative
democracy in Somalia. The manifesto recognized the
importance of clan system in Somali politics assertin g
that any Somali government endeavoring to construct a
viable state necessitates blending traditional and
modern institutions, as SNM was practicing at the time.
Similar to the British indirect rule, the SNM fused the
traditional institutions with the modern administration,
political, and military structure. It incorporated the
traditional leaders into the organization’s
administration by assembling the guurti—council of
elders or the upper house of elders. Although the powers
of the guurti are numerous, one essential aspect was,
and still is, their unchallenged influence on the
military and political leaders.
After the dictatorial regime was ousted, some
Somaliland’s military and political leaders fier cely
competed over power by assembling their particular
militias, akin to the merciless warlor ds of southern
Somalia. However, these ambitious leaders, in
Somaliland, had limited, if any, power over clan
militias, because each militia belonged to a particular
clan and took orders from their respective elders;
hence, the role of councils of elders. To prevent
lasting civil war, the elders asserted their power and
demanded each clan to contain its militia. Their
gatherin gs were conducted in a traditional way—under the
tree—to create peace and stability. Some of the notable
peace building conferences are: The Grand Conference of
the Northern People in 1991 in Burco (Shirwaynaha
Beelaha Waqooyi); The Tawfiiq Conference in 1992 in the
town of Sheikh; The Borama Conference also known as The
Conference of Elders of the Communiti es of Somaliland in
1993; and The Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation
Conference in 1993 in Erigavo city. Early 1990s was a
critical juncture during which the structural design of
Somaliland’s peace and state building was commenced. In
a nutshell, these conferences not only defined the fate
of Somalilanders, but also elevated their pride.
On the contrary, the factions in southern Somalia
operated under dictatorial leadership wher ein one
individual exercised complete control over his clan
militia due to the absence of traditi onal authority.
Wielding unrestrained power, military and political
ambitious men exclusively controlled and utilized their
respective clan militias to achieve selfish objectives,
be it politic al, financial, status, etc. There were no
grand reconciliation conferences similar to that of
So maliland where traditional leaders gathered to create
peace and stability.
Some of the factions included, but may not limit to:
United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Nati onal Alliance (SNA),
Somali Africans Muko Organization (SAMO), Somali
National Democratic Union (SNDU), Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya
(AIAI), all of which shared similar characteristics.
Knowing full well that they were the solitary authority
in the region, they launched their hist orical mass
destruction, rape, torture, and indiscriminate shelling
of civilian population, which continues up till now.
Conclusion
This piece endeavors to draw attention to the
fundamental causes of southern Somalia’s coll apse and
Somaliland’s triumphant during these difficult times. It
asserts that the elemental cause lies exclusively on the
absence and/or existence of traditional institutions in
the two regions. Although the underlying factors that
have played significant role for the failure are varied
and numerous, the decisive element of the miscarriage,
in southern Somalia, is the absence of traditional
institutions imbedded in Somali culture which was
abolished and crus hed by the Italian colonizers through
the vicious direct rule but were left intact in
Somaliland due to the British’s indirect rule.
Through the lenses of historical materialism, this
article reflects back the historical periods th at shaped
and sealed the fate of the two regions; namely, the
different manner in which Briti sh and Italy approached
the two regions, the negative effects of the civilian
and dictatorial governments, and the enduring warlord
politics. All of these negative effects were caused
simply by the absence of traditional institutions in
southern Somalia. Had it been that sou the rners’
tradition institutions were intact, as Somaliland, they
would have contained the br utal warlords’ reign of
terror as their counterparts successfully managed.
In the absence of traditional institutions, the southern
Somalis have persistently proposed f undamentally flawed
schemes in bringing about a solution to their civil war
(e.g., the illusion of top-down centralized formations;
the negligence of rehashing the traditional meditation
practices; warlord politics; seeking interference and
assistance from ill-informed foreign grou ps who have no
genuine interest in Somalia). Exhausted of remedies, it
is high time for southe rn Somalis to reverse this trend
and espouse pragmatic alternatives to ameliorate their
wors ening conditions by revisiting and reinventing the
traditional mediation practices, which have hitherto
served Somalilanders throughout history. In so doing,
southern Somalis require unde rstanding, imitating and
implementing the Somaliland’s unprecedented success of
state build ing through fusing traditional- and
modern-institutions.
Abdi Hussein Daud
Minneapolis, Minnesota |
He obtained B.A. in Political Science/Global Studies
from the University of Minnesota and cur rently pursuing
Masters in Health and Human Services Administration at
Saint Mary’s Univer sity of Minnesota.
He can be reached at:
abdihdaud@yahoo.com
|