Something is Rotten in the State of Somaliland
In Act I of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Marcellus, one of the sentries at
Elsinore Castle, utters the immortal line “something is rotten in
the state of Denmark” meaning that there exists in Den mark (the
setting of the play) a deep malaise that is having a profoundly
negative effect up on the country and its collective psyche (an
alternative understanding of the line is that the reference to
“Denmark” is to the King himself and the “rottenness” or malaise is
in his soul) – either explanation serves the purpose of this paper.
The genius of the bard, and indeed of all great dramatists, lies, at
least partly, in their talent for encapsulating complex and often
inex pressible thoughts and ideas in concise and simple language.
This is the essence and beauty of great poetry.
We can say today, with both confidence and sadness, that there is
something truly rotten in the state of Somaliland, and that
something is, without doubt, the current Kulmiye Governm ent. The
fiasco in Parliament on 12 February 2017 wherein at a joint session
of the two hous es, Wakiilada & Guurtida (Representatives and
Elders), the decision to grant a military base at Berbera to the
Government of Abu Dhabi was supposedly ratified, is but the latest
in a lon g line of Government actions that directly sacrifice the
public interest in favour of the perso nal gain of government
insiders and the ruling elite. The use of public office and
executive aut hority for personal enrichment has a long tradition and
is common in many countries, includi ng many so-called advanced
countries that often have the shameless temerity to lecture th eir
less developed counter-parts on the evils of corruption and the
imperatives of clean gove rnance and transparency in civic affairs.
However, it is fair to say that the Kulmiye Governme nt has elevated
executive corruption, public mendacity and the open manipulation of
public office for personal gain to a level unforeseen in the history
of Somaliland. We have now reac hed the rarefied heights of the Afweyne dictatorship with respect to the open and shamele ss theft of
public funds and assets by government officials from the highest
levels to the low est clerical cadres.
Government ministers are blatantly shameless in misappropriating
public funds for their pers onal use and in stealing public assets
and property (i.e. land, buildings vehicles etc.) by tran sferring
legal title to themselves or their family members. Another recent
example of the bre ach of executive privilege was the spectacle of a
coterie of ministers accompanying the Kulm iye Presidential
candidate, Muse Bihi, on a campaign tour of the eastern provinces of
Sool & Sanag. These officials saw no conflict between their
responsibilities as public servants sworn to work for the people and
uphold the constitution and openly campaigning for a candidate of
one of the three national parties, or if they did see the inherent
conflict of interest in their actions, they simply did not care –
indeed it is normal for government officials to refer to the Kulmiye
candidate as “Mr. President” even though the election is many months
away. This cul ture of impunity, entitlement and mendacity has been a
feature of the Kulmiye government for many years now, and it has
become more entrenched with each passing day.
The issue of granting a military base in Berbera to Abu Dhabi merits
close study for many re asons, most importantly because authorizing
the presence of armed, foreign military forces on one’s soil is an
extremely sensitive matter that has fundamental implications for
national sovereignty, foreign relations and national development.
Traditionally, nations permit foreign countries to base military
personnel and equipment on their soil for reasons connected with the
national security of the host country. For example, after World War
II, Germany and Brita in granted the US military bases in their
countries under the auspices of the NATO alliance in support of
their own national security against the threat of the USSR. In
response, under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact, the countries of
Eastern Europe granted the Soviet Union milit ary bases in their
countries. In Asia, South Korea and Japan permitted US military
bases in their countries to protect themselves against the perceived
threats from North Korea/China and the USSR respectively. The states
of Bahrain and Qatar have granted the US military ba ses in their
countries as a bulwark against the perceived threat to their own
national security from Iran.
In the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has granted military bases to
several foreign countries, namely France (due to the historic,
colonial relationship), the US (which is withdrawing this year due
to the base recently granted to China), China and (as recently
reported) Saudi Arabia. However, the case of Djibouti is somewhat
different from the examples in Europe and Asia me ntioned above.
Djibouti is a city-state with no mineral or other natural resources
with which it can support itself economically. Historically, its
only significant asset which can be conve t ed into economic value
has been its geo-strategic location – after all this was the
principal reason that France sought control over the city and its
environs during the colonial ‘Scramble for Africa’ during the 19th
century. Thus, for Djibouti, granting military bases to foreign
powe rs has a primarily economic motivation which has worked to its
benefit to date. With respect to Berbera and Somaliland, it is
instructive to analyse the various motivations that may lie b ehind
the decision by the Kulmiye government to grant such a base to Abu
Dhabi against widespread, popular opposition.
Firstly, Somaliland has no immediate and obvious threat to its
national security and sovereig nty against which the presence of
foreign military forces could be a credible deterrent. Ethiopia, the
country’s huge neighbour to the west is also its closest friend in
Africa as well as Somaliland’s greatest potential economic and
security partner. It is difficult to see Somalil and’s economic,
political and security development without Ethiopia as a close and
collaborat ive partner and ally; equally, it is clear that the future
of Ethiopia’s economic, trade and secu rity development and growth is
closely linked to free and unfettered access to Somaliland’s ports
and the entrepreneurial acumen of its vibrant private sector.
Somaliland’s other two neighbours, Djibouti to the north and Somalia
to the east and south, do not pose a serious, existential threat to
the country’s national security at present and are unlikely to do so
in the future. Thus, it is clear that fear of immediate, external
threats to its national survival does not comprise a credible
motivation for Somaliland to grant a military base to a foreign
power.
Secondly, let us examine the economic motivation which has been
widely and loudly touted by the Kulmiye government and its spokes
people. According to the government, the military base will provide
many well-paid jobs which are badly needed and which will contribute
to the local economy. The fact is that the foreign military bases in
Djibouti do not provide many such jobs to its people, despite the
fact that Djibouti, as a recognised member of the international
community of nations which has full access to the international
monetary, financial and trad ing systems has a much greater
opportunity to maximise the potential economic benefits of such
installations. The simple truth is that the relatively few jobs
provided to the host commu nities by many of these bases are in the
janitorial and cleaning sectors. Further, the local pur chasing of
most of these facilities is very limited since they tend to source
most of their goods and materials from their home countries. The
limited capacity for sourcing the required goods and materials
within Somaliland due to the lack of a local banking sector that is
conne cted to the international financial system, will militate in
favour of this trend. Finally, the expe rience of Japan and the
Philippines suggests that many of the economic and social conseque nces of hosting large foreign, military installations are
often negative for local communities, rather than positive. In
short, despite the glowing and rosy projections of the government
regarding the economic benefits of such a base, experience suggests
that the socio-econo mic consequences are uncertain at best, and
unambiguously negative at worst.
Finally, unlike Djibouti, Somaliland has ample mineral, pastoral,
agricultural and other natural resources upon which to base the
economic development of its small population of some 4-5 million.
Thus, renting out parts of the land and coast of the country in
order to capitalise upo n its geo-strategic location is neither the
only option available to secure economic benefit, nor is it a
particularly rational one. This rentier model of economic
development may be sens ible for a small city-state with a population
of half a million people (grosso modo), but it is lau ghable as a
viable economic strategy for a nation comprising approximately
138,000km2, incl uding 700km of coastline, with significant
agricultural, mineral, marine and pastoral resources that could be
relatively easily developed to yield economic benefits that would
transform the lives of its people beyond recognition. Thus, the
economic rationale for granting the base as advanced by the
government is a blatant fallacy.
Since there is no credible motivation with respect to its own
national security and the econ omic benefits of the proposed base are
uncertain and limited at best, the motivation of the Kulmiye
government in pushing through with granting the base against
widespread and vocif erous local opposition needs to be scrutinised
closely. Is there some critical threat to Somalil and’s security that
has been hidden from public view against which the proposed base
will be a defence? Is there some as yet undisclosed benefit that
will accrue to the country and its people that has been agreed upon
with Abu Dhabi, but which will emerge in the near future? Based upon
the government’s track record with respect to openness and
transparency, its history of mendacity and duplicity with respect to
foreign policy (principally in its relations and supposed dialogue
with the discredited and now defunct Dum-al-Jadid government of
Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud), the fact that it is now a ‘lame duck’
administration with just six months remaining of its tenure, not to
mention its well documented elevation of kleptocracy to a method of
governance as briefly outlined above, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to but conclude that the true motivation lies in the
personal gain of key government insiders.
Having established that the rationale and motivation for the
proposed base in Berbera do not fall within the parameters
applicable in many other countries that host bases for foreign
po wers, we can turn to the potential disadvantages that granting
such a base will bring to Som aliland. The first issue that needs to
be addressed is the proposed tenant of the base and the purpose for
which they propose to use it. The lessee is the Government of Abu
Dhabi and the stated purpose for its use is the execution of the air
campaign against the Houthi rebels in the Yemen War mounted by Arab
allies of the government lead by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In this
context, it us important to note that Abu Dhabi has also secured a
base in Asab in Eritrea which it has developed significantly since
2015 when the base was granted. Of course, Eritrea is closer to
Yemen and thus better suited as a base of operations against the
Houthi rebels, while southern Saudi Arabia is contiguous with Yemen
and is the present base of operations for the Arab allies in the
Yemen war.
In view of the above, and bearing in mind that Abu Dhabi has a close
military alliance with Eg ypt which has extended to mounting joint
air strikes against targets in Libya, many observ ers see a hidden
Egyptian hand in the request for the base in Berbera. This is a very
serious issue for Somaliland in view of the dispute between Egypt
and Ethiopia over the Nile waters and Ethiopia’s plans to construct
hydroelectric dams on the headwaters of the Nile in its nort hern
mountains, in order to power its ambitious industrial development
plans. It has been widely reported that Ethiopia is greatly
concerned regarding the granting of the base in Ber bera to Abu
Dhabi, and it has made its concerns known to the Kulmiye government
on seve ral occasions. The fact is that the ramifications of the
proposed Berbera base for regional politics are very complex and
unclear.
For example, as mentioned above, the principal player in the Arab
alliance supporting the Ha di government in Yemen, namely Saudi
Arabia, has recently secured a military base in Djibo uti, while
simultaneously signalling its displeasure with Egypt by supporting
Ethiopia’s policy to develop its power generation capacity through
construction of dams on the Nile headwa ters in its northern waters.
In December 2016, Saudi Arabia sent several delegations to Add is
Ababa, one of which visited the Renaissance Dam, and signed economic
cooperation agree ments with Ethiopia, including joint investment in
hydroelectric power projects. Further, as the new administration in
the US signals retrenchment in its global military footprint, and
conversely China indicates expansion of its global military
footprint (witness their game of musical chairs with respect to
bases in Djibouti), regional powers will seek to enhance their
projection of military power in the region in support of their
respective interests. In this context, it is also important to bear
in mind Russia’s determination to maintain their naval base in Tartus in Syria as evidenced by Russia’s substantial and decisive
military support for the Assad regime in the Syrian war. In January
of this year, this Russian policy bore fruit as the two countries
signed an agreement to expand and upgrade the base, while making
Russia’s use of it permanent.
With respect to the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean, these
regional powers comprise Eg ypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India, while
the superpowers also jostle for advantage as US str ategic
imperatives under the new administration become clearer. The
immediate future, ther efore, for regional politics and strategic
alliances presents a period of increased com petition and regional
turmoil as these regional powers jostle for advantage and position
in the shado w of superpower realignment, expansion and retrenchment.
It is into this witches brew of tu rmoil, localised wars and
intensified regional competition, that the Kulmiye government has
waded with nary a thought except for its own immediate and petty,
material gain.
The people of Somaliland are much wiser
than their rulers
and
understand the dangers and shifting alliances of their
neighbourhood, and for this reason have opposed the proposed ba se
by a wide majority. It is clear that the story with respect to granting
of the base is by no means concluded, and it is very likely that the
incoming government of Somaliland will reverse the decision of the Kilmiye government after the elections scheduled for September this
ye ar. In the meantime, those elements of the Kulmiye government that
have been pushing for approval of granting of the base will have
secured their ‘thirty pieces of silver’ at the cost of the interests
of their nation and people. However, this is but what we have come
to expect from this morally bankrupt
and lame duck government.
Ahmed M.I. Egal
February 2017
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