Somaliland: What
Somalia Could Be
J.Peter Pham, PhD
It
came as no surprise when Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for
Peace released their “Failed States Index 2009” three weeks ago
that, once again, Somalia topped the rankings. What I reported two
weeks ago about the country’s “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG)
continuing to lose what little ground it has left in the face of an
onslaught from Islamist insurgents is even truer as the forces of
al-Shabaab (“the youth”), the al Qaeda-linked group formally
designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by the U.S. Department
of State last year, and its allies, including the Hisbul al-Islamiyya
(“Islamic party”) group of Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys, a figure who
appears personally on both United States and United Nations
antiterrorism sanctions lists, seize control of more and more
neighborhoods in Mogadishu.
At the beginning of last week, Shabaab leader Ahmad Abdi Godane,
a.k.a. “Abu Zubeyr,” went so far as to issue an ultimatum to
government soldiers to surrender their weapons and leave the front
lines within five days or face being tried before an Islamic court
alongside TFG leaders after the final collapse of the interim
regime. Over the weekend, peacekeepers from the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) apparently exceeded their United Nations
mandate to limit their activities to self-defense and undertook to
do what the TFG forces have been wholly incapable of doing: battling
insurgents in northern Mogadishu. Dozens were killed and hundreds
injured in some of the heaviest street fighting to date as the AU
troops first recaptured districts in the name of the TFG only to
lose them again as the insurgency deployed additional forces to the
capital.
Meanwhile the TFG continued to wheel about like a drunk, its
capacity for self-destructive behavior apparently unabated by the
mortal peril it finds itself in. On Tuesday, two French security
advisers on assignment to train the interim regime’s presidential
guard were kidnapped at gunpoint from their Mogadishu hotel and
marched away in their boxer briefs. According to a report by Jeffrey
Gettleman of the New York Times, the assailants were Saleebaab
lineage Habar Gidir sub-clansmen of TFG interior minister Abdiqadir
Ali Omar who had been absorbed into the government’s forces but were
“upset about not getting paid for risking their lives in recent
battles.” The two kidnapped men have subsequently been handed over
to Islamist insurgents. The congenital dysfunctional nature of the
TFG (see my report earlier this year on the farcical selection
process for its current president), however, did not stop the United
Nations, the African Union, and the subregional Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) from convening in Nairobi, Kenya,
this week yet another international conference aim at shoring up
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and his remnant.
All of this simply underscores what I asserted in my Congressional
testimony at the end of June: “If the failure so far of no fewer
than fourteen internationally-sponsored attempts at establishing a
national government indicates anything, it is the futility of the
notion that outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia.”
A number of correspondents have since challenged me about what would
happen absent foreign intervention, as if Somalis are somehow
inherently incapable of self-governance. Fortunately, an example
already exists of the emergence of a stable and peaceful Somali
state: the Republic of Somaliland. While certainly far from perfect,
Somaliland shows what is possible when a “bottom-up” or
“building-block” approach is allowed to take place instead of
imposing the hitherto favored “top-down” strategy for resolving
conflicts, consolidating peace, and state-building within a
political space. It also illustrates how a process that is viewed as
legitimate and supported by the populace can also address the
international community’s interests about issues ranging from
humanitarian concerns to maritime piracy to transnational terrorism
(see the report in last Sunday’s New York Times by Andrea Elliott
about young Somali-Americans as fighters for al-Shabaab, “A Call to
Jihad, Answered in America,” as well as the indictment this week by
a federal grand jury of two men, Salah Osman Ahmed and Abdifatah
Yusuf Isse, for recruiting them).
The British Protectorate of Somaliland gained its independence as
the State of Somaliland on June 26, 1960. Less than a week later, it
merged with the former Italian colony of Somalia in the south and
east in a union which Somalilanders regretted almost from the
beginning – the just one year after, the northerners overwhelming
rejected by referendum the unification constitution – as they faced
increasing marginalization within both government and civil society
at the hands of their numerically superior ethnic kinsmen. Such was
the oppression, especially after a 1969 military coup brought
General Mohamed Siad Barre to power, that by the 1980s a
full-fledged civil war was underway with the dictatorship taking
ever harsher measures to suppress the Somali National Movement (SNM),
the primary opposition group in Somaliland. Things had gotten so far
out of hand that, in 1988, Siad Barre’s air force actually
perpetrated one of the most bizarre war crimes in the annals of
armed conflict: taking off from the airport in Hargeisa, the
principal northern city, the aircraft bombed some 80 percent of that
very same city.
Somalilanders will tell those who inquire that the only reason they
were willing to make the sacrifice of entering into a union with the
former Italian colony of Somalia was that it was part of a movement
to bring all the Somali-speaking areas of East Africa under one
polity. However, with Ethiopia and Kenya both long ruling out any
secession of their Somali-populated regions and Djibouti voting
overwhelming in a 1967 referendum to reject any unification with the
Somali state, the grand nationalist dream essentially died. The rump
union was hence held together by brute force.
After the dictator fled from Mogadishu in January 1991 with the
remnants of the last effective government of the Somali Democratic
Republic collapsing around him, elders representing the various
clans in Somaliland met in the bombed out city of Burao and, on May
18, 1991, agreed to a resolution that annulled the northern
territory’s merger with the former Italian colony (a number of
international law scholars had long questioned the legal validity of
the act of union) and declared that it would revert to the sovereign
status it had enjoyed upon the achievement of independence from
Great Britain. The chairman of the SNM, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur,”
was appointed by consensus to be interim president of Somaliland for
a period of two years.
In 1993, the Somaliland clans sent representatives to Borama, a town
in the territory of one of the smaller clans, the Gadabuursi, for a
national guurti, or council of elders. The numerically predominant
‘Isaq were allocated 90 delegates, while the Harti were given 30
delegates, and the Gadabuursi and ‘Ise split another thirty
delegates. Interestingly, while the apportionment of seats on the
guurti a rough attempt to reflect the demographics of the territory,
the actually decision making was by consensus over the course of the
four months which the assembly met. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who
had briefly been prime minister of independent Somaliland in 1960 as
well as democratically-elected prime minister of Somalia between
1967 and the military coup in 1969, was chosen as president of
Somaliland.
President Egal’s tenure saw, among other things, the drafting of a
permanent constitution for Somaliland, which was approved by 97
percent of the voters in a referendum in May 2001. The constitution
provides for an executive branch of government, consisting of a
directly elected president and vice president and appointed
ministers; a bicameral legislature consisting of an elected House of
Representatives and an upper chamber of elders, the guurti; and an
independent judiciary. After Egal’s death while undergoing surgery
in Pretoria, South Africa, in May 2002, he was succeeded by his vice
president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, who subsequently was elected in his
own right in a closely fought election in April 2003 – the margin of
victory for the incumbent was just 80 votes out of nearly half a
million cast and, amazingly, the dispute was settled peaceably
through the courts. Multiparty elections for the House of
Representatives were held in September 2005 which gave the
president’s party just 33 of the 82 seats, with the balance split
between two other parties. As a report from the International Crisis
Group noted at the time: “The elections were impressive: under the
auspices of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC), 246
candidates contested 82 seats in an endeavor involving 982 polling
stations; 1,500 ballot boxes (bags); 1.3 million ballot papers;
4,000 polling station staff; 6,000 party agents; 3,000 police; 700
domestic observers and 76 international observers…their peaceful,
orderly and transparent conduct was no small achievement.”
Both elections were widely acknowledged by both domestic and
international observers as free and fair. One might add that the
achievement of having staged democratic polls for both the executive
and legislative branches of government is even more impressive when
one considers the failure to even set up a functioning government in
central and southern Somalia and the generally questionable nature
of elections elsewhere in the region – when they are even held at
all. If all goes well, the progress will be consolidated when, on
September 27, 2009, Somalilanders go to the polls for combined
presidential and legislative elections, both of which have been
delayed for a number of reasons, most having to do with technical
competence and capacity, although one cannot help but note a certain
lack of enthusiasm on the part of the incumbent president at the
prospect of facing the electorate. Progress was made over the
weekend as the three political parties in Somaliland – the United
Peoples’ Democratic Party (UDUB), the Peace, Unity and Development
Party (Kulmiye), and For Justice and Development (UCID) – signed an
electoral code of conduct.
Meanwhile, civil society, so devastated in the rest of the Somali
lands, has made tremendous strides in Somaliland, carving out a
space for private civic and charitable engagement. To cite just one
example, the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital in Hargeisa, founded in
2002 by Edna Adan Ismail, the former foreign minister of Somaliland
(2003-2006) who donated her pension from the World Health
Organization as well as other personal assets to it, provides a
higher standard of care than available anywhere else in the Somali
lands for maternity and infant conditions as well as diagnosis and
treatment for HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases and general
medical treatments. In addition, the hospital serves as a teaching
hospital, training an entire generation of nurses and midwives
qualified to provide reproductive healthcare throughout the country
and serving as a medical research center, with a special attention
paid to the health problems associated with female genital
mutilation.
In an op-ed piece after a visit to Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa
two years ago, New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof
summarized all of this rather nicely:
Here in the north of the carcass of Somalia is the breakaway
would-be nation of Somaliland, and it is a remarkable success – for
a country that doesn’t exist.
The U.S. and other governments don’t recognize Somaliland, so the
people here get next to zero foreign aid. And when the “country” was
formed in 1991, it had been mostly obliterated in a civil war and
was a collection of ruins and land mines.
Yet the clans and elders here formed their own government, held free
elections and even established an international airline. Relying on
free markets and a general exhaustion with violence, the people of
Somaliland embraced tranquility and democracy and searched for ways
to make a buck.
Walk down the streets of Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, and
instead of gunmen you come across the thriving jewelry and financial
market: scores of vendors, most of them women, are hawking millions
of dollars worth of gold, precious stones and foreign currency out
in the open air. (Don’t try that at home!) Continue down the street,
and you see that Hargeisa has police cars, DHL service, cable
television, orthodontists, a multitude of Internet cafes and traffic
jams (including the horses and camels). There are public schools and
hospitals—even a public library.
This is a conservative Muslim country, yet it is generally
pro-American and tolerant. In the last election, more women voted
than men. Women’s groups are fighting the traditional practice of
genital mutilation, administered to 97 percent of girls here.
The lesson of Somaliland is simple: the most important single
determinant of a poor country’s success is not how much aid it
receives but how well it is run. If a country adheres to free
markets and good political and economic governance, it will generate
domestic and foreign investments that dwarf any amount of aid.
Interestingly, even the African Union (AU), notoriously reluctant to
do anything that might suggest that the map of African could be
redrawn, has, as I reported here more than eighteen months ago,
acknowledged the unique circumstances surrounding Somaliland’s quest
for international recognition as well as its tremendous achievements
to date despite the lack of that sought-for acceptance. The official
report of an AU fact-finding mission to the republic in 2005 led by
AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka concluded: “The fact that
the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also
malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes
Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and
self-justified in African political history. Objectively viewed, the
case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s
Box’. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with
this outstanding case.”
Last year, the AU’s special representative for Somalia, Nicolas
Bwakira, likewise reported positively on Somaliland to the
organization:
Somaliland has a Constitution that emanated from grassroots
consultations…the constitution serves as a fundamental law in
Somaliland and does enjoy respect and wider acceptance in the wider
political spectrum. It provides for the relevant branches of
government (legislative, Judiciary and executive) and the effective
separation of powers that go along with it. The House of the Elders
(known as “Guurti”) is an additional arm of the system intended to
safeguard and ensure the accountability and sustainability in
Somaliland. Additionally, there is an Independent Electoral
Commission which is responsible for the planning, preparing and
conducting of Municipal, Presidential and Parliamentarian elections.
This nascent democracy in Somaliland provides a sense of pride and
needs to be learned by the rest of Somalia. It is a very encouraging
and rewarding socio-political development prevailing in Somaliland
compared to the rest of the country whereby insecurity, piracy and
insurgent activities are rampant.
The Burundian diplomat, who has been involved in liberation
struggles in Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, astutely noted the
reason for this success lay in the indigenous nature of the effort:
“Somaliland has achieved peace and stability, using the traditional
way of solving problems (known locally as ‘Xeer’) and through a
home-grown disarmament, demobilization and re-integration process
and internally driven democratization.” Although he did not say so,
this local origin and buy-in is precisely what I and other observers
have repeatedly argued has been missing from efforts in central and
southern Somalia where, as I noted earlier this year, “even by the
opera buffa standards set by the fourteen attempts at a national
framework for governance since the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre fled
from the presidential palace seventeen years ago, the selection of
the latest pretender to the leadership of the nonexistent Somali
state [TFG “president” Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed] was farcical.”
Special envoy Bwakira concluded his report with some sensible
suggestions for both the international community in general and the
AU in particular:
As a peace dividend, the international community should provide
institutional capacity building support to Somaliland infrastructure
and facilitate its access to the international and regional
financial institutions and banking systems.
The African Union Commission and [the subregional Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development] should explore channels of communication
and dialogue with the Somaliland authorities, and establish the best
way they could be integrated into the regional socio-economic and
political discourses including issues such as migration, illegal
smuggling of arms, the fight against piracy and displacement of
populations.
Likewise, the authors of a just-released Human Rights Watch report –
which was not without its criticisms of Somaliland’s
authorities—noted:
Human Rights Watch takes no position on whether Somaliland should be
recognized or which country or multilateral institution should take
the lead on resolving the issue. But donors, the AU, and other key
international actors should develop concrete and pragmatic policies
that are tailored specifically to Somaliland’s complex realities
instead of continuing to shoehorn their engagement with Somaliland
into the same framework as their policies on south/central Somalia.
Somaliland’s needs, achievements, and problems bear little
resemblance to those of Somalia and Puntland. Recognition or no,
Somaliland should not be saddled with donor policies that are
primarily geared to the context of looming famine and endless
conflict in the south.
In particular, donors and key foreign governments should move
immediately to deepen their engagement with Somaliland’s government,
civil society, and other institutions…Somaliland is at a crossroads
and the territory’s impressive human rights and security-related
gains could be jeopardized.
In his speech to the parliament of Ghana last Saturday, President
Barack Obama outlined four areas as “critical to the future of
Africa”: democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution
of conflict. While highlighting increases in foreign assistance his
administration has sought, the president noted that “the true sign
of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that
helps people scrape by – it’s whether we are partners in building
the capacity for transformational change.” If these are the
standards by which Africa policy is to be determined, then
Somaliland surely has both moral and strategic claims on the
attentions of the United States and its partners. Whatever their
shortcomings, the people of Somaliland have demonstrated over the
course of nearly two decades a dogged commitment to peacefully
resolving their internal conflicts, rebuilding their society, and
forging a democratic constitutional order. Their achievements to
date are nothing short of remarkable in subregion as challenging as
the Horn of Africa, especially when one considers the lack of
international recognition under which they labor. It is not only
prejudicial to our interests, but also antithetical to our ideals,
to keep this oasis of stability hostage to the vicissitudes of the
conflict which the rest of the Somali territories are embroiled
rather than to hold it up as an example of what the others might
aspire to – and could readily achieve if they weren’t so busy
fighting over the decayed carcass of a dead state and the resources
which the international community stubbornly continues to throw at
it in hopes of reanimating the corpse.
In addition to serving on the boards of several international and
national think tanks and journals, FamilySecurityMatters.org
Contributing Editor Dr. J. Peter Pham has testified before the
U.S.Congress. Feedback:editorialdirector@familysecuritymatters.org.
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