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The "Letter-of-Death" by General 'Morgan'
January 23, 1987
Following is the famous "Letter-of-Death" as translated into English
by Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa, former President of the Supreme
Court, including his explanatory notes as footnotes:1
The report is addressed to the President of the SDR, the Minister of
Defence, and the Minister of Interior. The latter, Major-General
Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla, is also a son-in-law of the President, and
Third Deputy Prime Minister. Since President Barre is also the
Minister of Defence -- the previous holder of that portfolio,
General Mohamed Ali Samatar, having been promoted Prime Minister on
January 30, 1987 -- the report is seemingly confined to family
members. This would explain its extreme frankness in specifying
certain clans as targets for implemented and recommended punitive
action.
The target is the Isaaq Clan Family. The term "clan family" was
first coined by Professor I.M. Lewis, Professor Social Anthropology
at the London School Economics, to describe the collective name for
each of the several major divisions to which Somali clans
traditionally divide themselves. The Isaaq clan family sub-divides
into four main clans.
Top Secret
The Somali Democratic Republic
The Ministry of Defense
26th Sector G.H.Q.
TQ 826/XKT/28-56/87
Date: 23/01/87
Report
To: The President of the SDR
Mogadishu
The Minister of Defence, SDR
Mogadishu
The Minister of Interior, SDR
Mogadishu
Please refer to the report on the state of the defence and security
of the 26th Sector's area of control which I transmitted on
17.1.87.2
The security of the North West and Togdheer Regions has
deteriorated. The Ethiopians brought additional troops to the area
with the objective of securing a foothold similar to [those of]
Balan Balle and Galdogob.3 As you gathered from my previous report,
they did not succeed in their joint incursion. Subsequently we took
punitive measures against the positions jointly occupied by Qurmis4
and the Ethiopians resulting in loss to both of them and in the
obliteration of villages, including Dibiile, Rabaso, Raamaale, and
Garanuugle.5 All our measures were implemented at night and, except
for some light injuries, all the troops returned safely to base.
Following their incursions and their consequent losses, Qurmis
resorted to appealing to clan sentiment and began to sound a clarion
call to action under [the slogan] "On Isaaq clans!".6 Their
objective is to present the curfew7 as a persecution of their own
people. Similarly, they directed a propaganda campaign at the people
to the effect that they were about to capture the North West Region
and Togdheer.
This much can be gathered from the expressions written on the walls
of buildings and from the leaflets distributed in Gabiley District,
and at Allaybaday village, Lughaya District.8 All this is an
indication of a resurgence of anti-State clan sentiment. They have
appealed to their various sections to recruit 2000 persons for
Qurmis to be trained in Awaare.<$FAwaare, south of Hargeisa, is deep
in Somali-populated eastern Ethiopia, in the area commonly known as
the Ogaden. So far, 400 individuals have joined. Similarly, 60 Sa'ad
Muuse members of the Faraweyne Front9 and a lieutenant who was their
commanding officer gave themselves up to the Ethiopians and the
Qurmis following the capture of the State-wreckers. The rest stole
into the bush out of fear, but they have now started to return to
the village.
Comrade President, Comrades:
It has been demonstrated to us that, unless Qurmis and its
supporters are subjected to a campaign of obliteration, there will
come a time when they will raise their heads again. But, today, we
possess the right remedy for the virus in the [body of the] Somali
State. It consists of:
Balancing the well-to-do to eliminate the concentration of wealth
[in the hands of the SNM supporters].
The reconstruction of the Local Council in such a way as to balance
its present membership which is exclusively from a particular
people; as well as the dilution of the school population with an
infusion of children from the Refugee Camps in the vicinity of
Hargeisa.10
Rendering uninhabitable the territory between the army and the
enemy, which can be done by destroying the water tanks and the
villages lying across the territory used by them for infiltration.
Removing from the membership of the armed forces and the civil
service all those who are open to suspicion of aiding the enemy --
especially those holding sensitive posts.
We set out below for your information those steps of the planned
action already implemented:
Before now the number of buses used as public transport were 337,
two-thirds of which were owned by members of one clan (the Sa'ad
Muuse). However, when, on investigation, it became clear that most
of the buses were not operating in accordance with security
procedures, due to defects in their registration and circulation
documents; and when information received revealed that they were
sometimes used to carry drugs11 or persons open to suspicion, in
secrecy and without notification to the security organisations; and
since the number of buses greatly exceed the needs of the city, the
following decisions were adopted and implemented:
(a)the number of the buses must not exceed 80;
(b)every bus must have a serial number for identification purposes;
(c)the buses must be evenly distributed amongst the districts of the
city, with each bus limited to a particular route and departure and
finishing points;
(d)a just and balance redistribution of licences regulating bus
ownership in such a way as to give preference to persons relating to
the Revolution, and to deny those politically opposed to it; six
four-wheel drive vehicles were confiscated at Berbera harbour, and
similarly, the removal of vehicles in the city is in progress; those
found to be serviceable will be mounted with weapons and the others
used as transport for reconnaissance purposes and for officers in
command of forces in forward positions; we are also engaged in a
process of reclassifying transport.
Of the persons detained as suspected supporters of Qurmis, 45 are
from Hargeisa, 30 from Burao, while seven are officers. Most of them
are businessmen and well-to-do people, while some are headmen (Nabadoons).12
They are held in Mandhera prison. However, it is hereby requested
that they be transported urgently to Laanta Buur prison, or Bari
prison, etc.13 in order to ensure their continued incarceration
during the reorganisation of the local prisons which show many
defects from a security standpoint.
The Western Somali Liberation Front14 has been remobilized, and 300
men have been stationed at a place near Geed-Deeble.15 According to
plan, they will be re-armed and then put amidst those brigades and
battalions considered to be capable of furthering the fight against
Qurmis. At the same time they can implement operations inside
[Ethiopia] whenever required.
Since it has become evident that the Isaaq were, by act and intent,
with the SNM; and since we could not see them giving up the line
they have pursued so deceptively for some time; and in order to
forestall them; we arranged for the other inhabitants of the North
continuous meetings and a mobilization campaign designed to rouse
them to action and to raise their level of awareness. This was
intended to strengthen their unity and to surround Somali unity with
a defensive wall. Among those inhabitants are: the Awdal people, the
various sections of Western Somalis, the Las Qorey people, and the
Daami people, etc.16 There is no doubt that the unity of these
people will restore the balance of the scales which are now tipped
in favour of the Isaaq. If they attack their tasks energetically,
their unity will also undoubtedly humble those who arrogantly
maintain that they own the North when the reality is otherwise.
We are still engaged in identifying the positions of those people
who maintain current accounts at banks in the North West and
Togdheer Regions. The accounts of those recognised as Qurmis
supporters will continue to be frozen; the rest will be unfrozen in
the near future.
We see the economic strangulation of the people who work for the
enemy as serving a useful purpose. However, it is absolutely
essential that this should be accompanied by the strengthening of
the economic positions of non-Northerners, with a view to raising
the level of their capabilities and their interests in these
Regions. This will enable them to put under pressure those who have
grown fat on the opportunities offered by the Government banks, but
have revolted against the State, having persuaded themselves to use
their acquired capabilities against the State and it Revolutionary
Government.
Undoubtedly, those successive steps, taken to cripple Qurmis, will
instill anxiety in those in Mogadishu who are related to it. We hope
that these will not be listened to or heeded so that the impetus of
the war being waged against it would not drop.
An investigation into the action of Qurmis against the Burao base
revealed that a lieutenant and five sakaris (all police) and some
civilians had been behind it. It was implemented by the Habar Je'lo
Qurmis.17 When the inquiry is completed, the culprits will be
court-martialled.
Comrade President, in order to implement the above-mentioned
matters, we need to:
(a)purge the Somali Police Force, the Security Force, and the
Hangash Force,18 the members of all of which are largely recruited
locally; this can be done by finding a force to dilute them and by
transferring the present members; and
(b)replace the present members of the Custodial Corps, who -- having
assumed the distinctive character of being exclusively from the
North -- cannot be entrusted with the task of guarding the prisons,
with a force composed of other Somalis.
2.We also need up to a Division to reinforce the 3rd Division's zone
if it is possible to withdraw units from sectors whose areas of
control are stable, since the quality of a force in a state of
mobilization cannot achieve very much.
3.We also need the power of the Commercial Bank to give loans and to
determine who shall receive them to be transferred to us, so that
the past mistakes relating to the economic strengthening of the
anti-State people may be rectified and those worthy of it be given a
chance.
We propose that those of our forces we consider to be unsatisfactory
should send representatives to discuss urgent corrective action. The
reason is that the reaction to the measures we have already taken or
will take must be met in advance. Since the intelligence-gathering
organisations are suspect, and since some of them have committed
clear offences, it is prudent to take precautionary measures before
it is too late. Up to now we have been walking on ground
deliberately strewn with broken glass in an attempt to reduce the
momentum of [our] efforts. It is essential to sweep away the broken
glass without leaving a single piece behind. There is a Somali
proverb: "Oh hyena, you cannot drag away hides without making a
sound."19
We are awaiting your guidance and directives.
(signed)
Major General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi (Morgan)
The Commander of the 26th Sector, North West
Translator's Note:
The translation of the text of the above report is from Somali --
the original language of the report. The footnotes are not part of
the report and have been added by me to enhance the clarity of the
document. Accuracy, rather than elegance of style, has been my
principal aim in this translation.
I am persuaded, on investigation, that the signature to the report
which purports to be that of Major-General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi
(Morgan) (Commander of the 26th Sector and de facto governor of the
regions covered by the report) is in fact his own, and that the
report is genuine.
My aim in translating this remarkable document is to make it
available to researchers, lawyers, and human rights officials. I am
not a member or sympathiser of the SNM or SSDF, although I am
opposed to the present regime in Somalia.
In my years in Somalia as a legal practitioner, or member and then
President of the Supreme Court, I never saw an official document
with recommendations so frank in their departure from legality or
accepted norms. Such a document ought not to be allowed to be
confined to dissident circles that are privately circulating copies
of the original.
This translation was done by me, Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa, in
London on April 27, 1987.
(signed)
Mohamoud Sheikh Ahmed Musa
Signed before me this 27th day of April 1987 by the above mentioned
(signed)
R. Barnett
113-116 Strand
London WC2
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