Horn
of Africa's challenges grow
The political and economic outlook for the Horn of Africa in 2009.
SIGNIFICANCE: The region in 2009 will continue to see some of the
world's worst humanitarian, political, and security crises, but
major political changes are in the air that could yield new
opportunities for stability.
ANALYSIS: After a turbulent 2008,
the Horn of Africa will continue to face serious challenges into
2009, especially in Somalia.
Key insights
Food insecurity will be a major
factor across the region, contributing to economic pressures from
high prices and decreased remittances.
Somalia's TFG and moderate opposition
face a steep challenge in implementing the Djibouti Agreement,
despite likely Ethiopian withdrawal.
Ethiopia's border stalemate with
Eritrea will continue, though the cost of war is probably too high
for both sides.
Somalia's Shabaab militants may
take their insurgency against Ethiopia out of Mogadishu, and into
Ethiopia itself or third countries.
Somalia. Developments in Somalia will reverberate across the region:
1. Djibouti Agreement. The June 2008
Djibouti Agreement represents a hopeful breakthrough between the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and moderate elements of the
opposition, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The
accord commits both sides to a ceasefire, establishes a joint
security committee for eventual integration of forces, envisions
power-sharing talks, and calls for a UN mission to bolster African
Union peacekeepers in order to permit the orderly withdraw of
Ethiopian forces. However, the new moderate coalition formed under
the agreement already faces serious resistance from hardliners in
the TFG -- including President Abdullahi Yusuf and his supporters,
who control all of the TFG security sector -- and the hardline
Islamist Shabaab militia.
2. TFG future. The TFG enters the fifth
and final year of its mandate completely dysfunctional and divided.
There will probably be major leadership changes, and there is a real
possibility that the TFG will be driven out of Mogadishu entirely by
the insurgents once Ethiopian forces withdraw. The TFG's main
preoccupation in 2009 will be to convince foreign governments and
the UN to extend its mandate, despite its lack of progress. Donors
do not want to see the TFG fail, and may consider other options even
worse.
3.
Ethiopian policies. Ethiopia has already redeployed much of
its occupying force and appears intent on removing itself from
Mogadishu later in November. The occupation has proven very costly
to Ethiopia financially and diplomatically, and has had a corrosive
effect on its military. However, Ethiopia has powerful security
interests in shaping politics in post-intervention Somalia. It will
thus keep some forces along border areas and will provide support to
local allies to ensure, at a minimum, that hardline Islamists cannot
consolidate control over Mogadishu.
4. Armed
opposition. The insurgents in Somalia have essentially won --
they now control most of south and central Somalia and much of the
capital. However, deep existing divisions between groups will
certainly become worse once Ethiopian forces withdraw from Mogadishu
and the TFG is no longer viable. Sporadic clashes between Islamist
and clan militias answering to the ARS and the Shabaab have already
occurred, with much more deadly clashes very likely to erupt in 2009
-- fuelled in part by external influences.
5.
Humanitarian crisis. Somalia is now the world's worst
humanitarian crisis, with 3.2 million people in need of aid, and
relief efforts undermined by attacks on aid workers. The longer the
crisis continues, the greater the danger that displaced Somalis will
face famine conditions. If security improves in the capital, a
massive spontaneous relocation of up to 700,000 displaced persons
could result, creating its own relief challenges.
6. Somaliland.
October terrorist bombings in Somaliland's capital Hargeysa badly
shook residents, and reinforced fears that spill-over from the south
will engulf the would-be state. Nevertheless, the longer-term impact
of the terrorist bombings, for which Shabaab has claimed
responsibility, will instead be the discrediting of radical Islamism
in Somaliland and a concerted public and government effort to clamp
down on hardline Islamists in their community. Somaliland is still
likely to hold closely contested but not destabilising general
elections sometime after March 2009.
7. Puntland and piracy. Security and governance in the
northeast state of Puntland deteriorated badly in 2008, a trend that
will worsen in 2009. Unpaid security personnel are the source of a
major crime wave and the region is now the epicentre of the worst
concentration of piracy in the world. The piracy is likely to face
an increasingly heavy-handed international response, including
attacks on the mainland lairs of the pirates and on the financial
holdings of the powerful patrons behind the piracy. Puntland will
also face severe security crises in 2009 if the TFG collapses and
the uncontrolled government militiamen recruited from Puntland
return home.
Border disputes. The UN Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea dissolved in 2008, and the stand-off over the
disputed border between Ethiopia and Eritrea shows no signs of
peaceful resolution. Despite a heavy military build-up on the
border, the threat of warfare between the two states has abated
somewhat; risks are too high to both sides at this time. Eritrea's
inexplicable border skirmish with neighbouring Djibouti is unlikely
to be rekindled, as Djibouti enjoys the support of France and the
United States, both of which have military bases there.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia and Eritrea will continue to engage in proxy
wars aimed at destabilising the other.
Ethiopia.
In 2009, Addis Ababa's biggest crisis will be economic, with the
possibility of serious public unrest if food insecurity worsens:
Food shortages. A combination of factors -- inflation, high food and
fuel costs, drought and security operations -- has resulted in 12
million Ethiopians being in need of emergency food aid. This
emergency is concentrated in rural areas of eastern and southern
Ethiopia, but affects most of the country. Forecasts suggest the
crisis will worsen into 2009. Violence limits humanitarian access in
eastern Ethiopia.
Economic pressures. Years of impressive
economic growth are coming to an end, with the IMF's growth forecast
for 2009 cut back to 6.4%. Remittances from the large diaspora are
expected to drop. Pressures on urban households are growing and
could spark unrest in major cities, where the government enjoys
little support.
Political clampdown. In April, the government consolidated control
of district level political units in elections that were boycotted
by the opposition. The government is passing controversial
legislation that would severely curtail the activity of civil
society groups to engage in any advocacy or human rights work. This
closure of political space is expected to continue through 2009
despite external protests.
Insurgencies and terror threats.
Government forces will continue to mount counter-insurgency
operations in Somali Regional State against the Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF). That region will remain very volatile, and
military operations will continue to target civilian populations
suspected of supporting the ONLF. The expansion of Shabaab suicide
bombings into Somaliland and Puntland, which in one case destroyed
an Ethiopian government building in Hargeysa, suggests that Shabaab
insurgents intend to take its war with Ethiopia beyond southern
Somalia. Terrorist attacks against Ethiopian targets inside Ethiopia
or in third countries are thus a growing possibility in 2009.
Eritrea.
Eritrea will continue to face extreme economic duress, including
very worrisome food shortages, but will continue to embrace a policy
of isolation and autarky in 2009. Opposition to the government is
too weak to pose any threat of regime change, but the threat of a
coup is worth watching if the current leadership allows the country
to slip much further into economic collapse.
Djibouti. Djibouti's incumbent party, the Union for the Presidential
Majority, won all 65 seats of parliament in 2008 elections that were
boycotted by the opposition. President Hassan Gouled will face no
serious opposition in 2009, but the threat of terrorist attacks in
Djibouti is greater in the wake of the expanded campaign by the
Shabaab insurgency.
CONCLUSION: Armed conflict will worsen
in Somalia in the short term but is likely to subside in an
inconclusive stalemate, as a partial Ethiopian withdrawal removes
some of the main drivers of the armed insurgency. Threats of
terrorist attacks are greater across the region in 2009, especially
against Ethiopian targets. Economic woes and food shortages will be
the main preoccupation across the region. Republished on Relief Web
with the permission of research and consulting firm Oxford Analytica
Ltd.
Source: Oxford Analytica
|